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ABSTRACT
For most of human history, the essential nature of creativity was understood to be cumulative and
collective. This notion has been largely forgotten by modern policies that regulate creativity and
speech. As hard as it may be to believe, the most valuable components of our immortal culture were
created under a fully open regime with regard to access to pre-existing expressions and re-use. From
the Platonic mimesis to Shakespeare’s “borrowed feathers,” the largest part of our culture has been
produced under a paradigm in which imitation—even plagiarism—and social authorship formed
constitutive elements of the creative moment. Pre-modern creativity spread from a continuous line
of re-use and juxtaposition of pre-existing expressive content, transitioning from orality to textuality
and then melding the two traditions. The cumulative and collaborative character of the oralformulaic tradition dominated the development of epic literature. The literary pillars of Western
culture, the Iliad and the Odyssey, were fully forged in the furnace of that tradition. Later, under
the aegis of Macrobius’ art of rewriting and the Latin principles of imitatio, medieval epics grew out
of similar dynamics of sharing and recombination of formulas and traditional patterns.
Continuations, free re-use, and the re-modeling of iconic figures and characters, such as King Arthur
and Roland, made chansons de geste and romance literature powerful vehicles in propelling crosscountry circulation of culture.
The parallelism between past and present highlights the incapacity of the present copyright system
to recreate the cumulative and collaborative creative process that proved so fruitful in the past. In
particular, the constant development and recursive use of iconic characters, which served as an
engine for creativity in epic literature, is but a fading memory. This is because our policies for
creativity are engineered in a fashion that stymies the re-use of information and knowledge, rather
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than facilitating it. Under the current regime, intellectual works are supposedly created as
perfect, self-sustaining artifacts from the moment of their creation. Any modifications, derivations,
and cumulative additions must secure preventive approval and must be paid off, as if they were
nuisances to society.
Rereading the history of aesthetics is particularly inspiring at the dawn of the networked age. The
dynamics of sharing of pre-modern creativity parallel the features of digital networked creativity. As
in the oral-formulaic tradition, digital creativity reconnects its exponential generative capacity to the
ubiquity of participatory contributions. Additionally, the formula—the single unit to be used and reused, worked and re-worked—is the building block of the remix culture as well as the oral formulaic
tradition. Today, in an era of networked mass collaboration, ubiquitous online fan communities,
user-based creativity, digital memes, and remix culture, the enclosure of knowledge brought about
by an ever-expanding copyright paradigm is felt with renewed intensity. Therefore, I suggest that
the communal, cumulative, social and collaborative nature of creativity and authorship should be
rediscovered and should drive our policies. In order to plead my case, I have asked for the support of
the most unexpected witnesses.
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REDISCOVERING CUMULATIVE CREATIVITY FROM THE ORAL FORMULAIC
TRADITION TO DIGITAL REMIX: CAN I GET A WITNESS?
GIANCARLO F. FROSIO*
I. COMPLAINT
In the short window during the 1980s between the emergence of digital
sampling and the first decisions that outlawed it, Public Enemy released its album It
Takes a Nation of Millions, which was critically acclaimed for its influence on hiphop. Building his sonic wall, Public Enemy attempted to make use of bricks kneaded
with water and clay of a communitarian musical tradition. Public Enemy linked
together past and future: avant-garde music with the traditional African American
and Caribbean culture of musical borrowing. In an interview given after the judicial
turmoil that took down digital sampling, Carlton Douglas Ridenhour, the frontman of
the rap band Public Enemy, better known by his stage name “Chuck D,” explained
the impact of copyright on Public Enemy’s creativity:
Public Enemy’s music was affected more than anybody’s because we were
taking thousands of sounds . . . . The sounds were all collaged together to
make a sonic wall. Public Enemy was affected because it is too expensive to
defend against a claim. So we had to change our whole style, the style of It
Takes a Nation and Fear of a Black Planet, by 1991 . . . . Putting a hundred
small fragments into a song meant that you had a hundred different people
to answer to . . . . It’s easier to sample a groove than it is to create a whole
new collage. That entire collage element is out the window.1
A few years later, in Caught, Can I Get a Witness?, Chuck D bragged “[c]aught,
now in court ‘cause I stole a beat / This is a sampling sport / Mail from the courts and
jail / Claims I stole the beats that I rail . . . I found this mineral that I call a beat / I
paid zero.” 2 The same witness may be of use for an entire generation of digital
remixers, vidders, creators of “machinima,” developers of fangames, fanfiction
writers, and users generating content.

* cc-by Giancarlo F. Frosio 2014. Residential Fellow, Stanford Law School, Center for Internet
and Society; S.J.D., Duke University School of Law, Durham, North Carolina; LL.M., Duke
University School of Law, Durham, North Carolina; LL.M., Strathclyde University, Glasgow, UK;
J.D., Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy.
You can reach me at
giancarlo.frosio@law.stanford.edu or gcfrosio@gmail.com.
1 Kembrew McLeod, How Copyright Law Changed Hip-Hop: An Interview with Public Enemy’s
Chuck D and Hank Shocklee, in Cutting Across Media: Appropriation Art, Interventionist Collage,
and Copyright Law 155 (Kembrew McLeod & Rudolf Kuenzli eds., 2011) [hereinafter McLeod, How
Copyright Changed Hip-Hop]; see also KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: RESISTANCE
AND REPRESSION IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 62–114 (2007) [hereinafter MCLEOD,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION].
2 See McLeod, How Copyright Changed Hip-Hop, supra note 1, at 152.
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II. WITNESS EVIDENCE
In the pages that follow, I will try to come up with supporting evidence to
demonstrate that digging for “minerals,” appropriating and reusing them to produce
follow-on creativity is exactly what creativity is all about. I will make my argument
by telling you of a postmodern dream I had. In my oneiric fantasy, I have tried to
answer Dangerous Chuck’s call for a witness. The most unexpected of them came to
support his case.
A. Homer’s Testimony: Iliad, Odyssey, and the Oral Formulaic Tradition
It was late in the morning when the judge summoned the first witness. A blind
old man walked in from the backdoor of the courtroom.
“Can you state your name, sir?” Chuck’s D’s attorney asked.
“My name is Homer. And I have never existed, in fact. I am a backformation. I have become the archetypal poet through a process of
‘authorization’.” 3 As Gregory Nagy puts it, Homer is “retrojected as the
original genius of heroic songs, the proto-poet whose poetry is reproduced by
a continuous succession of performers.”4
Homer’s works have been surrounded by many questions related to the
composition, authorship, and date of the Iliad and Odyssey. This debate crossing the
ancient, middle and modern era is known as the Homeric Question. 5 In the
eighteenth century, the Homeric Question became ontological. The very existence of
Homer himself was put under scrutiny. François Hédelin, Gianbattista Vico, and
Friedrich August Wolf argued that Homer was a symbol of poetic genius. 6 Setting
aside whether Homer had really existed or was only a symbolic figure, the process of
making the Homeric verse is the central question to bear relevance in the quest for
the origins of the Iliad and Odyssey. That process was dissected and unveiled in the
last century by the innovative theories of an emerging school of philological studies,
spearheaded by Milman Parry. As a result of these theories, the making of the
Homeric verse would be the outcome of a collaborative and cumulative creative
See ANDREW BENNETT, THE AUTHOR 34 (Routledge 2005) (discussing Homer’s
“authorization”).
4 GREGORY NAGY, HOMERIC QUESTIONS 92 (Univ. of Tex. Press 1996); JAN DE VRIES, HEROIC
SONG AND HEROIC LEGEND 2–10 (Ayer Co. 1963).
5 See generally, e.g., NAGY, supra note 4, at 92; HOMERIC QUESTIONS: ESSAYS IN PHILOLOGY,
ANCIENT HISTORY AND ARCHEOLOGY, INCLUDING THE PAPERS OF A CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BY THE
NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE AT ATHENS (15 MAY 1993) (JAN PAUL CRIELAARD, J. C. GIEBEN 1995)
[HEREINAFTER HOMERIC QUESTIONS]; JAN DE VRIES, HEROIC SONG AND HEROIC LEGEND 2-10
(Oxford University Press 1963).
6 See FRANÇOIS HÉDELIN, CONJECTURES ACADÉMIQUES, OU, DISSERTATION SUR L’ILIADE
(Honoré Champion 2010) (1715); GIANBATTISTA VICO, DISCOVERY OF THE TRUE HOMER (Cornell
Univ. Press 1984) (1725); FRIEDRICH AUGUST WOLF, PROLEGOMENA TO HOMER (Princeton Univ.
Press 1985) (1795).
3
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process that lasted for centuries. This insight is today known as the oral-formulaic
theory.7
Milman Parry was a brilliant scholar who died at the age of thirty-three.
Nonetheless, Parry had enough time to revolutionize the study of early epic poetry by
disclosing the oral and formulaic origin of the works later textualized as the Iliad
and the Odyssey.8 The textual evidence suggested to Parry that the written poems
emerged from an evolutionary process in which composition, performance, and
diffusion interacted to create the epics we know as the Iliad and the Odyssey.9 Parry
demonstrated that the Homeric verse had a very different style and form than those
of later poets, and “that it is to a very great extent a language of traditional formulas,
created in the course of a long period of time by poets who composed in the mind
without the aid of writing.”10 Parry singled out the Homeric epithet as the pivotal
evidence inferring the oral heritage of the poems. 11 Parry noted that Homeric
epithets, such as Achilles “swift-footed,” Hector “shining-helmet,” Hera “cow-eyed,”
“divine Odysseus,” Athena “gray-eyed,” the “rosy fingered dawn,” or the sea “as dark
as wine,” changed according to the needs of meter, not according to the needs of the
narrative context. Again, many lines in a passage, groups of lines, or even larger
narrative patterns were wholly reproduced in one or more other passages of the
Homeric works. Parry concluded that the repetition of ready-made expression would
have found no meaningful explanation, unless that text predated its origin in an oral
tradition. The formulae were only functional devices to be used and re-used to help
the aoidous to remember and perform in the given length of the verse.
The poetic diction permeating the Homeric works was, therefore, the cumulative
creation of many generations of oral poets over centuries. “From generation to
generation bards had preserved words and phrases which . . . could be drawn on for
the making of poetry,” Parry noted.12 Generations of poets had created a “grammar
of poetry” to be superimposed on the grammar of the language. 13 Aoidoi and
rhapsodes could draw from this grammar to perform their poetic speech. In reusing
this common stock, poets would add their own contributions. In case of a particularly
brilliant aoidous, perhaps such as Homer, the original contribution to the common
stock of formulas and verses could have been more substantial than in other

7 See generally JOHN M. FOLEY, ORAL-FORMULAIC THEORY AND RESEARCH: AN INTRODUCTION
AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (Garland Publ’g 1985) [hereinafter FOLEY, ORAL-FORMULAIC
THEORY]; WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY: THE TECHNOLOGIZING OF THE WORD (Routledge

2012) (1982).
8 See MILMAN PARRY, THE MAKING OF HOMERIC VERSE (Adam Parry ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1971).
9 See NAGY, supra note 4, at 30 (stating that composition, performance, and diffusion are the
three interacting aspects of production and development of Homeric poetry).
10 DENYS PAGE, HISTORY AND THE HOMERIC ILIAD (Univ. of Cal. Press 1959) (commenting on
Parry’s Masters of Arts dissertation, in which he first proposed the oral-formulaic theory).
11 See PARRY, supra note 8, at 1–190.
12 Id. at 195.
13 ALBERT BATES LORD, THE SINGER OF TALES 36 (Stephen Mitchell & Gregory Nagy eds.,
Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 2000; see also Egbert J. Bakker, Noun-Epithet Formulas, Milman Parry,
and the Grammar of Poetry, in Homeric Questions, supra note 5, at 97-125.
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instances. However, the contribution of each singer would have been always
minimal, if compared to the entire stock of formulary diction.14
The poetic formulary of the Iliad and Odyssey resulted from a continuous
process of imitation of an original pattern. The creation, use, and survival of epic
formulae rested on resemblance and imitation across the generations of singers
elaborating on the tradition. 15 Chance was not guiding this process of imitation;
rather, there was a precise model of creative production that borrowed and reused a
tool to reach stylistic perfection. Under this model, the capacity of taking that
process of quality improvement to the extreme was recognized as creative genius.
Homer was perhaps that creative genius. 16 He was the aoidos who gave unity to a
tradition. He was the individual who sewed together a story that was fashioned
collectively.
[W]e should rather conceive that here is a poet who marked his works with
genius not because he was able to model the words on his own thoughts, but
because he was able to make use of traditional words and expressions. For
us to recognize a renunciation of this sort demands a tremendous effort of
imagination. . . . It is not easy to put aside the literary conventions of one’s
own era in favour of those of another.17
This way, the Iliad and the Odyssey would appear to be the final result of an
open model of collaborative and cumulative creativity that spanned centuries. As
Professor Gregory Nagy noted, “the evolution of the fixed texts that we know as the
Iliad and Odyssey may be envisaged as a cumulative process, entailing countless
instances of composition/performance in a tradition that is becoming streamlined into
an increasingly rigid form as a result of ever-increasing proliferation.”18
The investigation of one of the most influential works of Western culture leads to
a very different perception of creativity than the one we are currently accustomed to
accepting. This ancient model of creativity departs considerably from the modern
mechanics, at least those crystalized in the legal system in force. In oral poetry, any
individual work is ceaselessly reworked and modified. Creativity is the act of
blending together individual contributions; it is the act of the “sewer of songs.” In
modern eyes, this may very much resemble an act of plagiarism. Milman Parry was
aware of the contradiction when crafting his theory, and commented:
But in practice the oral poet by no means limits his borrowing to the single
formula; rather he uses whole passages which he has heard. This is,
See PARRY, supra note 8, at 331.
Id. at 197.
16 See DE VRIES, supra note 4, at 10–11 (sustaining the view that the unity of the Iliad and the
Odyssey was the work of Homer after all, and noting that “Homer is the crowning end of a long
development”).
17 PARRY, supra note 8, at 144–45.
18 GREGORY NAGY, THE BEST OF THE ACHAEANS: CONCEPTS OF THE HERO IN ARCHAIC GREEK
POETRY (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1999); see also JOHN M. FOLEY, Traditional Oral Epic: The
Odyssey, Beowulf, and the Serbo-Croatian Return Song 20–31 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1990) [FOLEY,
TRADITIONAL ORAL EPIC].
14
15
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indeed, his whole art: to make a poem like the poems he has heard. I know
only too well that this is sure to suggest the thought of plagiarism to those
not familiar with oral poetry, but it must be understood above all that
plagiarism is not possible in traditional literature. One oral poet is better
than another not because he has by himself found a more striking way of
expressing his own thought but because he has been better able to make
use of the tradition.19
It is straightforward that oral-formulaic theory may work towards the deconstruction of the myth of original creativity, dear to modern Western society.
Arnold Hauser noted the distance and the irreconcilable tension of the Homeric idea
of creativity with the romantic ideal of artistry and authorship. The Homeric works
would be construed as products of collective genius as opposed to the romantic idea of
individual genius.
It upsets all romantic conceptions of the nature of art and the artist—
conceptions which are the very foundation of nineteenth-century aesthetics
—to have to think of the Homeric epics, in all their perfections, as being the
product neither of individual nor of folk poetry, but, on the contrary, as an
anonymous artistic product of many elegant courtiers and learned literary
gentlemen, in which the boundaries between the work of different
personalities, schools and generations have become obliterated. 20
If all his language is formulaic, Homer, the definitive poet, was no more than a
“spokesman for a tradition.”21 Albert Lord backed up the idea by noting that in oral
poetry there is no origin, but only a process of development, refinement, and
elaboration. In oral poetry and Homeric poems, therefore, “the words ‘author’ and
‘original’ have either no meaning at all . . . or a meaning quite different from the one
usually assigned to them.”22 Oral-formulaic theories encountered great suspicion for
threatening the idea of poetic original greatness of Homer. The traditional formulary
nature of Homer’s language has seemed to cast an aspersion on Homer’s inventive
power, as described by Theodore Wade-Gery:

PARRY, supra note 8, at 334.
ARNOLD HAUSER, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF ART 57 (Routledge 1999).
21 BARRY B. POWELL, HOMER 20 (Blackwell Publ’g 2004). Powell wrote:
19
20

If all Homer is formulaic, the proof of Homer’s “orality,” where is the brilliance
and poetic genius of the divine Homer? The followers of Wolf had removed Homer
from the equation: no more did Homer “write” the Iliad than Moses “wrote”
Genesis. Parry restored Homer and disproved the redacted text, but in so doing
seemed just as much to take away Homer’s opportunity for creativity and
greatness. If all his language is traditional, consisting of formulas and formulaic
expressions, then was not Homer more spokesman for a tradition than a creator
in his own right?
Id.
22

LORD, supra note 13, at 101.
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The most important assault made on Homer’s creativeness in recent years
is the work of Milman Parry, who may be called the Darwin of Homeric
studies. As Darwin seemed to many to have removed the finger of God from
the creation of the world and of man, so Milman Parry has seemed to some
to remove the creative poet from the Iliad and Odyssey.23
The comparison that Wade-Gery made with the Darwinian theories hinted to an
additional feature of past approaches to creativity. The development and later
textualization of the Homeric tradition belongs to an evolutionary model. 24 The
cultural artifact did not come to life as a perfect final product. Instead, it underwent
a prolonged process of evolution.
The evolutionary model is common to all epic poetry and originated from the
same mechanics governing the development of the oral tradition. In this regard, the
oral-formulaic theory is “a fundamental theoretical fulcrum in the study and
comparison of numerous other ancient, medieval, and even contemporary
literatures.”25 The Hittite epic poem Gilgamesh is one of the earliest examples. 26 As
an additional example, an evolutionary model is applicable also to the Indian
Sanskrit oral epic tradition.27 The Mahabharata, a monumental work roughly eight
times the size of the Iliad and Odyssey, and the smaller Ramayana were developed in
their final forms across many centuries. The formative period of the Mahabharata is
estimated from 400 B.C. to 400 A.D., and that of the Ramayana from 200 B.C. to 200
A.D. Again, the Bible and Biblical materials have oral roots that make them the
final textualization of a collaborative and evolutionary creative model. 28 The Koran
has arguably the same oral origin. The Arabic term Qur’an, and the verb from which
it was taken qu’ran, originally meant “vocalized recitation.”29
B. Virgil and Macrobius’ Testimony: From Platonic Mimesis to Roman Imitatio
Once Homer left the witness box, Macrobius came in to support Chuck D’s case
and he spoke on behalf of Virgil as well. Macrobius was the author of the Saturnalia,
written in the fifth century A.D., and which crystallized the principles of Roman
aesthetics. Macrobius’ Saturnalia heavily influenced later medieval literature. It
laid down the fundamental principles of literary description as an exercise of
HENRY T. WADE-GERY, THE POET OF THE ILIAD 38–39 (1952).
See NAGY, supra note 4, at 41–43 (positing at least five distinct consecutive periods of
Homeric transmission).
25 FOLEY, ORAL-FORMULAIC THEORY, supra note 7, at 12.
26 See GEOFFREY S. KIRK, THE SONGS OF HOMER 56–57 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
27 See NAGY, supra note 4, at 44–58; STUART H. BLACKBURN, ORAL EPICS IN INDIA (Univ. of
Cal. Press 1989); John Brockington, The Textualization of the Sanskrit Epics, in TEXTUALIZATION OF
ORAL EPIC 39 (Lauri Honko ed., 2000); DE VRIES, supra note 4, at 99–110.
28 See generally FOLEY, ORAL FORMULAIC THEORY, supra note 7, at 51, 71; HENRI-JEAN
MARTIN, THE HISTORY AND POWER OF WRITING 104 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1994); Robert C. Culley,
Oral Tradition and the Old Testament: Some Recent Discussion, in ORAL TRADITION AND OLD
TESTAMENT STUDIES 1–33 (Robert C. Culley ed., 1976); Robert C. Culley, Oral-Formulaic Language
in the Biblical Psalms, in 4 NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST SERIES (1967).
29 See Culley, supra note 28, at 114-115.
23
24
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imitation and emulation through invention, reordering, and different species of
modification of previous models.30
The Roman perception of creativity is far removed from the “modernist value
system, which from the Romantic era onwards has valorized originality and artistic
genius and, in consequence, denigrated copying.” 31 Copying, imitation, and
emulation in ancient creativity was an art in its own right. 32 In this respect, the
“anxiety of influence” of modern authorship was inconceivable to the Roman way of
thinking.33 In fact, Romans would have perceived the rejection of the influence of
predecessors as “peculiar, perhaps even foolish.” 34 At least in the literal context, the
rationale for generalized borrowing and re-use in Latin creative tradition was
explained by Seneca the Elder in the following terms: “not for the sake of stealing,
but of open borrowing, for the purpose of having it recognized.” 35 A poet might
borrow a motif from another poet so as to pay that poet a compliment and have the
reader discover that tribute. Henry Nettleship, renowned Virgilian scholar and
Oxford professor of the nineteenth century, noted that in early imperial Rome “no
sooner had a fine thought, phrase, or even rhythm been struck out by a poet, than
[sic] it became, by common consent, the property of all subsequent writers. To
appropriate was not to commit a plagiarism, but to do honour to its inventor.” 36
Again, Nettleship pointed out that “to use a friend’s verses seems to have been
regarded by the Roman poets as a compliment and a mark of affection.” 37 This theme
would later dominate medieval literature.38
Leading Roman authors have openly spelled out the centrality of imitation of
past works and models. In particular, originality of theme or story was far less
important than it is today.39 In contrast, Quintilian regarded imitation as a way to
reach excellence:
30 See DOUGLAS KELLY, THE CONSPIRACY OF ALLUSION:
DESCRIPTION, REWRITING, AND
AUTHORSHIP FROM MACROBIUS TO MEDIEVAL ROMANCE 36–78 (Koninklijke Brill NV 1999)
(illustrating the rules of description in Macrobius’ Saturnalia, the stages of descriptions, and their
influence on medieval writers and romances).
31 Elaine K. Gazda, Beyond Copying: Artistic Originality and Tradition, in THE ANCIENT ART
OF EMULATION:
STUDIES IN ARTISTIC ORIGINALITY AND TRADITION FROM THE PRESENT TO
CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY 2 (Elaine K. Gazda ed., Univ. of Mich. Press 2002).
32 See generally id.
33 See HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY (Oxford Univ.
Press, Inc. 1973).
34 Gazda, supra note 31, at 11.
35 Seneca the Elder, Suasoriae 3.7, as cited in GIAN BIAGIO CONTE, THE RHETORIC OF
IMITATION: GENRE AND POETIC MEMORY IN VIRGIL AND OTHER LATIN POETS 32 (Charles Segal ed.,
Cornell Univ. Press 1986).
36 HENRY NETTLESHIP, LECTURES AND ESSAYS ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH LATIN
LITERATURE AND SCHOLARSHIP 123 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010) (1885).
37 HENRY NETTLESHIP, ANCIENT LIVES OF VERGIL WITH AN ESSAY ON THE POEMS OF VERGIL IN
CONNECTION WITH HIS LIFE AND TIMES 62 (Nabu Press 2011) (1879).
38 See Jan M. Ziolkowski, The Highest Form of Compliment: Imitatio in the Medieval Latin
Culture, in POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES: A FESTSCHRIFT FOR PETER DRONKE 293
(John Marenbon ed., Koninklijke Brill NV 2001).
39 See Katharina de la Durantaye, The Origins of the Protection of Literary Authorship in
Ancient Rome, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 37, 70 (2007) (noting that, in this respect, Shakespeare’s
Elizabethan creativity also resembled this character of Roman creativity).
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[F]or there can be no doubt that in art no small portion of our task lies in
imitation, since, although invention came first and is all-important, it is
expedient to imitate whatever has been invented with success. And it is a
universal rule of life that we should wish to copy what we approve in
others.40
Imitation in Roman literature went hand in hand with the related search for
excellence. At least by the first century B.C., in the Rhetorica ad Herennium,
Cicero’s Brutus and De Oratore, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ On Imitation,
rhetorical doctrine put forward the conviction that imitation of great authors was the
surest instrument for attaining excellence in creative endeavors. 41 Roman authors
build upon the ideas of Plato and Aristotle that dominated the ancient construction of
aesthetics. Plato, and Aristotle, in part, made imitation the general principle of art. 42
In Plato and Aristotle’s view, art was a mimesis of reality. The Platonic emphasis on
imitation naturally made copying and borrowing necessary instruments of creativity.
The Platonic concept of artistic imitation deeply influenced Hellenistic and Roman
aesthetic and justified the largely imitative and cumulative nature of ancient
creativity. The theory dominated most of our history of aesthetic and was discredited
only under the influence of Romanticism, where the idea of Platonic imitation was
regarded as anything more than “a systematic violation of art,” “depriving it of all its
charms.”43
In the Ars Poetica, Horace crystallized the idea that literary mimesis meant not
only the imitation of nature, but also the imitation of literary precedents and
models.44 According to modern studies, ancient Roman literature knew three forms
of literary imitation—interpretatio, imitatio, and aemulatio.45 The interpretatio was
the less original adaptation and coincided with the direct translation of one source.
The imitatio was an adaptation that consisted in the borrowing of form, or content, or
both from one or more renowned Greek sources. The aemulatio, finally, was a form of
creative rivalry. Powerful examples are Virgil’s emulation of Homer’s epics and
Horace’s emulation of Alcaeus’ lyrics. Through interpretatio, imitatio, and aemulatio,
the Romans created an entire body of literature and visual art referring to, borrowing
from and drawing on Greek models. The literary mimesis initially included
40 MARCUS FABIUS QUINTILIANUS, IV, THE INSTITUTIO ORATORIA §§ 10.2.1–10.2.2 (Harold E.
Butler trans., 1922) (c. 35–100 C.E.); see also Ziolkowski, supra note 38, at 305.
41 See Ziolkowski, supra note 38, at 300.
42 See, e.g., Plato, Cratylus, in XII PLATO IN TWELVE VOLUMES 423cd (Harold N. Fowler trans.,
1921); Plato, Republic, in V–VI PLATO IN TWELVE VOLUMES 393c, 399a–c, 401a (Paul Shorey trans.,
1969); Plato, Laws, in X–XI PLATO IN TWELVE VOLUMES 655d, 668a–c, 795e (R G. Bury trans.,
1967); Aristotle, Poetics, in XXIII ARISTOTLE IN 23 VOLUMES 1448b (W. H. Fyfe trans., 1932).
43 Otto Apelt, Platonische Aufsätze 68–70 (1912), as cited in WILLEM J. VERDENIUS, MIMESIS:
PLATO’S DOCTRINE OF ARTISTIC IMITATION AND ITS MEANING TO US 1–2 (1972).
44 See Quintus Horatius Flaccus, Ars Poetica, l. 19–134 (c. 18 B.C.E.), as cited in THE WORKS
OF HORACE: TRANSLATED LITERARY INTO ENGLISH PROSE 306 (Christopher Smart trans., 1863);
Ziolkowski, supra note 38, at 298.
45 See Arno Reiff, Interpretatio, imitatio, aemulatio:
Begriff und Vorstellung literarischer
Abhängigkeit bei den Römern (1959) (Ph.D. Dissertation, Universitat Köln); JAMES HARDIN,
TRANSLATION AND TRANSLATION THEORY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY GERMANY 59–60 (1992);
Ziolkowski, supra note 38, at 300.
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exclusively Greek literature, though later was extended to a select group of Roman
authors. In the early stage of Roman literature, there were great presumptions that
the majority of the dramatic writings that appeared in Rome were in great part
based upon Greek originals. 46 As the assumptions go, Latin poets of the fourth and
third century were translating the Greeks, or at least paraphrasing them. Ennius,
often referred to as the father of Latin literature, was said to have generally
simplified and amplified the plays of Euripides. 47 Discussing Ennius’ Medea, Cicero
stated that it was a “word for word” translation of the Medea of Euripides.48 Again,
as mentioned by Cicero, The Young Comrades of Caecilius, or Terence’s Maid of
Andros were adaptations, or perhaps bodily translations, of two earlier comedies
from Menander.49
Virtually all ancient and medieval writing were based on the imitation of
traditional paradigms and models. 50 Horace’s ausus idem—daring to rewrite—
characterized most of the ancient and medieval literary experience. 51 The art of
rewriting—or description—is illustrated by Macrobius’ Saturnalia in minute detail.52
Macrobius gave scholastic substance to Horace’s literary challenge by providing his
readers with an articulated description of the literary relationship between auctor
and imitator—author and rewriter. In the Saturnalia, Macrobius provided a full
account of Virgil’s borrowings. 53 Macrobius quoted “actual lines of Homer which
Virgil has translated almost word for word,”54 then decided “to go through the Aeneid
from the beginning, book by book.” 55 Later, Macrobius “tells us of the Virgil’s
borrowings from the old writers of Rome as well.” 56 Macrobius goes on for more than
ten chapters detailing instances of verbatim duplications, borrowings, translations
and rewritings of the Homeric original and Roman authors, such as Ennius,
Lucretius, Furius, Lucilius, Pacuvius, Naevius, Sueius, Varius, Accius and
See GEORGE H. PUTNAM, AUTHORS AND THEIR PUBLIC IN ANCIENT TIMES 177–78 (Kessinger
Publ’g 2003) (1893).
47 See GEORGE A. SIMCOX, I, HISTORY OF LATIN LITERATURE FROM ENNIUS TO BOETHIUS 34
(Kennikat Press 1971) (1883).
48 See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, I, DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM 4 (1914).
49 Id. at 4–5.
50 Modern aesthetics standards have departed considerably from this arrangement. Since the
end of the eighteenth century the status of imitation has been questionable. In a classic article on
imitation in antiquity, Richard McKeon declared that “[t]he term ‘imitation’ is not prominent in the
vocabulary of criticism today. In such use as it still has, it serves to segregate the bad from the good
in art.” Richard McKeon, Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity, 34 MOD.
PHILOLOGY 1 (1936), reprinted in CRITICS AND CRITICISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 147 (Ronald S.
Crane ed., 1952). To the sensibility of the moderns, “[i]mitation conflicts with ideals (sometimes
illusory) of originality, spontaneity, innovation, unconventionality, improvisation, self-expression,
and individuality that have held sway since Romanticism.” Ziolkowski, supra note 38, at 296.
51 Flaccus, supra note 44, at 323 ll. 240–42 (“Ex noto fictum carmen sequare, ut sibi
quivis/Speret idem, sudet multum frustaque laboret/Ausus idem [I would execute a fiction taken
from a well-known story, that anybody might entertain hopes of doing the same thing; but, on trial,
should sweat and labor in vain]”).
52 See MACROBIUS, THE SATURNALIA (1969).
53 Id. at 290–343 (describing Virgil’s adaptations of Latin writers); see also KELLY, supra note
30, at 58.
54 MACROBIUS, supra note 52, at 290.
55 Id. at 295.
56 Id. at 385.
46
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Catullus. 57 In connection with the enumeration of Virgil’s borrowings, Macrobius
sketched out the principles of imitatio and aemulatio that governed ancient literary
creativity by noting:
[T]he reward of ones’ reading is to seek to rival what meet with one’s
approval in the work of others and by a happy turn to convert to some use of
one’s own the expressions one especially admires there. For this is what
our writers have often done, borrowing both from one another and from the
Greeks; and this is what the greatest of the Greeks often did among
themselves . . . . But if all poets and other writes are allowed to act among
themselves in this way, as partners holding in common [haec societas et
rerum communio], what right has anyone to accuse Virgil of dishonesty, if
he has borrowed from his predecessors to embellish his poems?58
As Macrobius had shown, imitation and borrowing as championed by Virgil
strengthened their status as instruments of literary and artistic excellence. If the
poet, to be regarded as the ultimate model, had himself heavily imitated and
rewritten his predecessors, then creativity could only progress through imitation.
This was the lesson that the ancients, Virgil and Macrobius, left to powerfully
resound for the following millennium. Large parts of the greatest and most
representative works produced in Latin, French, and English in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries were rewrites, following Macrobius’ principles of description.59
C. Chaucer’s Testimony: Social Textuality and Auctoritas
Now, enter Geoffrey Chaucer (1343–1400), the father of English literature.
Chaucer expressed the common medieval attitude that almost everything there is to
say has been said.60 Nullumst iam dictum quod non sit dictum prius, Terence firstly
noted. 61 In the Prologue to The Canterbury Tales and other passages, Chaucer
presented himself as a mere compiler or translator, who was not the auctor of the
books he made and who was not responsible for the materials he used.62

Id. at 290–343, 386–409.
Id. at 385–86.
59 KELLY, supra note 30, at xiii.
60 See JOHN A. BURROW, MEDIEVAL WRITERS AND THEIR WORKS:
MIDDLE ENGLISH
LITERATURE AND ITS BACKGROUND, 1100–1500 34 (1982).
61 Publius Terentius Afer, Eunuchus l. 41 (c. 161 B.C.E.), in I TERENCE: THE LADY OF ANDROS,
THE SELF-TORMENTOR, THE EUNUCH 238 (John Sargeaunt trans., 1918) (“In fact nothing is said
that has not been said before. So you should recognize facts and pardon new playwrights if they
present what their predecessors presented before them.”).
62 See BENNETT, supra note 3, at 42; THE IDEA OF THE VERNACULAR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF
MIDDLE ENGLISH LITERARY THEORY 1280–1520 (Jocelyn Wogan-Browne et al. eds., 1999)
[hereinafter THE IDEA OF THE VERNACULAR]; BURROW, supra note 60, at 36–37; SEBASTIAN COXON,
THE PRESENTATION OF AUTHORSHIP IN MEDIEVAL GERMAN NARRATIVE LITERATURE 1220–290
(2001) (mentioning that many well-known German authors of the mid-twelfth and thirteenth
centuries often professed their works to be translations of French and Latin source texts).
57
58
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The disclaimer may echo, perhaps, that of Lucian of Samosata. He claimed a
millennium earlier his role as a mere mouthpiece of the Muses. He had Hesiod say
in one imaginary dialogue with the poet of old: “I might tell you that not one of my
poems is my own work; all is the Muses’, and to them I might refer you for all that
has been said and left unsaid.”63 In the Far East, Confucius would equally note that
“I transmit rather than create; I believe in and love the Ancients.”64 For Chaucer,
therefore, the act of writing was represented by the metaphor of gleaning the harvest
of poetry reaped by others:
For wel I wot that folk han here-beforn/Of Makyng ropen [reaped the
harvest of poetry], and lad away the corn;/and I come after, glenynge here
and there/And am ful glad if I may fynde an ere/Of any goodly word that
they han left.65
The medieval author “is configured as part of a continuum that extends from the
‘simple’ process of copying at one end to the act of ‘original’ composition at the
other.” 66 In a well-known commentary on the making of books, the thirteenthcentury monk Saint Bonaventure listed four types of makers of books:
There are four ways of making a book. Sometimes a man writes others’
words, adding nothing and changing nothing; he is simply called a scribe
[scriptor].
Sometimes a man writes others’ words, putting together
passages which are not his own; and he is called a compiler [compilator].
Sometimes a man writes both others’ words and his own, but with the
others’ words in prime place and his own added only for purposes of
clarification; and he is called not an author but a commentator
[commentator]. Sometimes a man writes both his own words and others’,
but with his own in prime place and others’ added only for purposes of
confirmation; and he should be called an author [auctor].67
In Bonaventure’s eyes, compiling, translating, commenting, or even simply
transcribing the works of great authors was a worthy aim for a medieval writer. 68
Even the lower functions on Bonaventure’s scale were marked with the fabric of
authorship. Bonaventure’s overlapping roles in the chain of creative literary
production blurred the contours of medieval authorship, reinforcing its social matrix.
63 Lucian of Samosata, Dialogue with Hesiod (c. 160–64 C.E.), in THE WORKS OF LUCIAN OF
SAMOSATA 568 (Henry W. Fowler & Francis G. Fowler trans., 2007).
64 Carla Hesse, The Rise of Intellectual Property, 700 B.C.--A.D. 2000: An Idea in the Balance,
131.2 Daedalus 26, 26 (2002) (reporting that the saying of Confucius was included in the Lun-Yii, or
Analects, compiled in China in the fifth century B.C.E.).
65 Geoffrey Chaucer, The Legend of Good Women, Prologue, G version 61–5, as cited in JOHN A.
BURROW, MEDIEVAL WRITERS AND THEIR WORKS: MIDDLE ENGLISH LITERATURE AND ITS
BACKGROUND, 1100–1500 31 (1982).
66 BENNETT, supra note 3, at 39.
67 Bonaventure, In Primum Librum Sentetiarum, proem, quaest. iv, in OPERA 14 (Quaraccchi
ed., 1882), as cited in BURROW, supra note 60, at 31.
68 See id. at 34.
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Instances of so-called “scribal interpolation” were common in the case of Chaucer’s
Canterbury Tales, which was left in a fragmentary state by Chaucer. Those
concerned with the transmission of the text spuriously added prologues, epilogues, or
tales.69
The poetic versification in the manuscript tradition is a major example of the
social history of medieval and renaissance poetic texts. Derek Pearsall noted that in
the context of late medieval poetic versification, the poetic text is an instrument to be
used and not merely read:
Poems are borrowed and their allusions to date and circumstances changed
so as to fit a new occasion.
Verses are incorporated into loveletters . . . stanzas from the common stock are interlaced and reworked;
simple pieces, including popular songs, are adapted for more ostentatious
purposes; famous opening stanzas and striking first lines are pressed into
service again and again to lunch new poems.70
Pearsall elaborated that the poems in the medieval manuscript tradition “are no
one’s property and the whole notion of authorship is in a way irrelevant.” 71 The work
tended to easily escape authorial control and enter into a world of easy appropriation
and alteration. Arthur Marotti spoke of social textuality, malleability, and textual
instability in manuscript culture. 72 What is viewed as corruption from a modern
author-centered perspective was viewed in the manuscript culture as transformative
elaboration, generally accepted and often welcomed by the original author. In this
regard, Marotti noted that “[i]n fact, some authors expected and even welcomed the
changes that recipients of their works brought to them, acknowledging the possibility
that modern textual scholarship has been reluctant to admit, that text might
(accidentally or deliberately) be improved by individuals other than the original
writers.”73
The special connection between God and creativity further cements the
communal and participatory nature of medieval authorship. In Medieval Theory of
Authorship, Alastair Minnis explained that the medieval auctor ultimately took his
authority from God. 74 The nature of creativity and authorship is reprocessed in
medieval terms under the light of the concept of authority. The author was seen as
receiving auctoritas—authority—to make authoritative statements directly from
God.75 The author was to be respected, believed, and finally quoted, extracted, and
Id. at 32.
DEREK PEARSALL, OLD AND MIDDLE ENGLISH POETRY 221 (1977); see also RICHARD L.
GREENE, THE EARLY ENGLISH CAROLS cxxxi (Clarendon Press 1935) (emphasizing the similar
plasticity of the text of carols).
71 PEARSALL, supra note 70, at 221.
72 ARTHUR F. MAROTTI, MANUSCRIPT, PRINT, AND THE ENGLISH RENAISSANCE LYRIC 135–59
(Cornell Univ. Press 1995).
73 Id. at 136.
74 See ALASTAIR J. MINNIS, MEDIEVAL THEORY OF AUTHORSHIP:
SCHOLASTIC LITERARY
ATTITUDES IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 10 (1988); Andrew Hope, Plagiarizing the Word of God:
Tyndale between Moore and Joye, in PLAGIARISM IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 93–94 (Paulina
Kewes ed., 2003) [hereinafter PLAGIARISM IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND].
75 See MINNIS, supra note 74, at 10.
69
70
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imitated.76 As a consequence of the special relation between creativity, authority,
and God, the medieval evolution of the classical concept of “imitatio rested on a
premise that reached far beyond the Classics. It joined authors ultimately with God,
the ultimate source of all creativity and the highest object of imitation.”77 In this
sense, in the Middle Ages, plagiarism might have been interpreted as “giving to the
people what God has given to the author.”78
Not surprisingly, in connection with this creative process joining the author with
God’s auctoritas, and therefore with the surrounding community, “writers gain
authority less by their originality than by their contribution to an ongoing
tradition.”79 As a result, authorship did not entail verbal inventiveness but rather its
opposite.80 The Middle Ages coined the very word text out of a textile metaphor to
recognize that many medieval writings “are fabrics that incorporate fibers from
earlier writings and preceding traditions.” 81 The task of vernacular writers—and
medieval authors in general—was perceived as that of understanding, interpreting
and elaborating past authorities, rather than competing with them. 82 The common
character of both the scribe and the author was to participate in an ongoing
intellectual tradition connected to past authorities.
In this sense, medieval
authorship “was more likely to be understood as participation in an intellectually and
morally authoritative tradition, within which . . . a writer might fill one of several
roles, copying, modifying and translating, as well as composing.”83
In the Middle Ages, creativity seemed to entail principally a process of slow
augmentation of “the knowledge and wisdom of humanity.” 84 It may be loosely
identified with the medieval idea of authority. Creativity was an inclusive medium.
The medieval author was a cell of a breathing organism, the medieval community,
and creativity was an instrument to strengthen the appurtenance of the author to
the community. Thus in the medieval period, creativity was largely conceived as a
participatory process, as opposed to the modern romantic individualistic perception.
Creativity in the Romantic sense is an exclusive medium, empowering the individual
to stand out from the community. But as to be discussed later, the idea of inclusivity
in the discourse over creativity has regained momentum. There is now more
emphasis on community, participation, and mass and cumulative production in the
digital environment.

Id. at 5.
Ziolkowski, supra note 38, at 302–03.
78 Natalie Zemon Davis, Beyond the Market:
Books as Gifts in Sixteenth-Century France,
33 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 69, 87 (1983).
79 THE IDEA OF THE VERNACULAR, supra note 62, at 5.
80 See Donald Pease, Author, in CRITICAL TERMS OF LITERARY STUDY 105–06 (Frank
Lentricchia & Thomas McLaughlin eds., 1990); BENNETT, supra note 3, at 40.
81 Pease, supra note 80, at 292; see generally, on the textile metaphor, ERNEST ROBERT
CURTIUS, EUROPEAN LITERATURE AND THE LATIN MIDDLE AGES (1991); Jan M. Ziolkowski, Text and
Textuality, Medieval and Modern, in DER UNFESTE TEXT: PERSPEKTIVEN AUFEINEN LITERATUR-UND
KULTURWISSENSCHAFTLICHEN LEITBEGRIFF 109–31 (Barbara Sabel and André Bucher eds., 2001).
82 See BENNETT, supra note 3, at 40.
83 THE IDEA OF THE VERNACULAR, supra note 62, at 4–5.
84 See BURROW, supra note 60, at 34.
76
77
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D. Anon’s Testimony: Anonymity and Mouvance
After Chaucer, it came the time for Anon to speak. Being the selfless medieval
minstrel, he or she spoke with the words of Virginia Woolf, who evoked Anon in an
unfinished literary history.85
The voice that broke the silence of the forest was the voice of Anon. Some
one heard the song and remembered it for it was later written down,
beautifully, on parchment. Thus the singer had his audience, but the
audience was so little interested in his name that he never thought to give
it. The audience was itself the singer; “Terly, terlow” they sang; and “By, by
lullaby” filling in the pauses, helping out with a chorus. Every body shared
in the emotion of Anon’s song, and supplied the story.
[Anon] is
the . . . common voice singing out of doors.86
Anon, Virginia Woolf continued, “was a simple singer, lifting a song or a story
from other peoples lips, and letting the audience join in the chorus.”87 Anon singing
was a community effort. Anon sang with and for the community. The image of Anon
symbolized the idea that early authorship was not an individual activity. In this
sense, Woolf, and later other scholars such as Margaret Ezell, read medieval
creativity in terms of social authorship. 88
In evoking Anon, Woolf expanded the perception of creativity to a nameless
domain, in which individual identity cannot satisfactorily describe authorship. Anon
was anonymous. Writing on the anonymous nature of medieval creativity, Woolf
noted:
Anonymity was a great possession.
It gave the early writing an
impersonality, a generality. It gave us the ballads; it gave us the songs. It
allowed us to know nothing of the writer: and so to concentrate upon his
song. Anon had great privileges. He was not responsible. He was not self
conscious. He can borrow. He can repeat. He can say what every one
feels.89
Anonymity became the most substantial sign of a social mode of literary
production. Foucault elaborated on the same point by noting that the “‘authorfunction’ is not universal or constant in all discourse” and “the same types of texts
have not always required authors; there was a time when those texts which we now
call ‘literary’ (stories, folk tales, epics, and tragedies) were accepted, circulated and
valorized without any questions about the identity of their author.”90
85 See Brenda R. Silver, Anon and the Reader: Virginia Woolf Last Essays, 25 TWENTIETH
CENTURY LIT. 356, 382 (1979).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See generally MARGARET EZELL, SOCIAL AUTHORSHIP AND THE ADVENT OF PRINT (1999).
89 Silver, supra note 85, at 397.
90 Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE:
SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 124–25 (Donald Bouchard ed., 1977). Foucault also explains
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Anon and Homer shared the same nature. The same mechanics of creativity and
authorship applied repeatedly across two millennia of human literary production.
Bards, minstrels, jongleurs, and troubadours played the same role of the aoidoi of
ancient Greece.91 Whether impersonating a wandering musician or a courtly poet,
Anon developed and refined a stock of vernacular oral-formulaic tradition across the
centuries.92 The final result of this cumulative and collaborative creative effort was a
monumental achievement. Medieval epics—that spanned from Beowulf to the
Chanson de geste and romance literature, or again from the Nibelungenlied93 to the
Finnish Kalevala, the Old Norse and Icelandic sagas 94—sprung beautifully, as the
Iliad and the Odyssey before them, from the oral tradition and the endless reworking
of patterns, characters, and themes by a nameless multitude of singers of songs.
Like Homer, the fictional Anon was one and all of those singers. He was the singer of
the vernacular tradition.
Cumulative oral production served as a matrix of the entire Western medieval
epic. Referring specifically to the Nibelungen epic, Henri-Jean Martin sketched the
development of this powerful continuum by noting:
As it had happen long before with the Homeric poems, more recently with
the Chanson de Roland, and, to a certain extent, with the Arthurian
romances, when the Nibelungen epic was set down in writing it resulted in
a masterwork that was something like a testament that passed on a legacy
of oral traditions whose days were numbered.95
Nancy Bradbury nicely summarized the fusion of oral and written traditions in
medieval epic and popular literature with the epithet “writing aloud.” 96 Performance
and writing of the medieval romance developed together in tight connection, so that
“the two traditions existed in a symbiotic relationship” and “clerks and
minstrels . . . often borrowed each other’s plumage.”97 The fluidity of traditional epic
and popular literature derived from the symbiotic relationship between oral and
written tradition. In this respect, Paul Zumthor noted that the medieval work often
that any concept of appropriation of a text cannot be used to describe the relationship between a
medieval author and a medieval text: appropriation of a text, as Foucault explained, is a form of
property unknown in the Middle Ages. Id.
91 See HAUSER, supra note 20, at 199–210 (discussing generally artistic figures and their social
and creative role).
92 See, e.g., Francis P. Magoun, The Oral-Formulaic Character of Anglo-Saxon Narrative
Poetry, 28 SPECULUM 446, 446 (1953); LORD, supra note 13, at 36, 198; FOLEY, TRADITIONAL ORAL
EPIC, supra note 18, at 33.
93 See Lauri Honko, Text as Process and Practice:
the Textualization of Oral Epics, in
TEXTUALIZATION OF ORAL EPIC 39 (Lauri Honko ed., 2000).
94 See, e.g., Stephen A. Mitchell, The Sagaman and Oral Literature: The Icelandic Traditions
of Hjörleifr inn kvensami and Geirmundr heljarskinn, in COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON ORAL
TRADITIONS: A MEMORIAL FOR MILMAN PARRY (John M. Foley ed., 1987).
95 MARTIN, supra note 28, at 163.
96 See NANCY M. BRADBURY, WRITING ALOUD: STORYTELLING IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND
(1988); COXON, supra note 62, at 146, 173 (confirming that a “strong oral tradition continued to
exert influence on written heroic literature” in Germany as well).
97 VITZ, supra note 96, at 46.
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“has no authentic text properly speaking,” but was “constituted by an abstract
scheme, materialized in an unstable way from manuscript to manuscript, from
performance to performance.” 98 The mouvance, as Zumthor termed it, was the
defining character of the medieval text, which “was generally presumed . . . to be
subject to . . . reinterpretation in the light of a new rnatiere, new understanding, new
intentions, or a new audience or patron.”99
As an effect of the merging between oral and written tradition, the mouvance
was strongly correlated with the well-defined narrative units of the pre-modern
popular culture. As Peter Burke argued, “folksongs and folktales, popular plays and
popular prints all need to be seen as combinations of elementary forms, permutations
of elements which are more or less ready-made.” 100 The episodic quality of premodern popular culture boosted a process of creative recombination that
characterized a large chunk of the history of popular culture. The secret of the
“proliferativeness” of traditional pre-modern narrative lay in the idea that “[e]very
story is constituted of many smaller stories or potential stories,” because at the
intersection of each unit was situated the possibility of new stories, retellings and
remixing of the old.101
E. Chrétien de Troyes’ Testimony: Romance Literature and the Art of Rewriting
Chrétien de Troyes, the great star of the romance tradition, also came in to
support Chuck D’s case and continued from where Anon had left off. Chrétien was
the master of the art of rewriting. The art of rewriting, principles of which
Macrobius’ Saturnalia illustrated to medieval authors, characterized most of the
medieval romance literature. Medieval Romances rewrote their predecessors and, as
Marie de France would say, they added “their own meaning to make the book
better.” 102 As Douglas Kelly noted in The Conspiracy of Allusion: Description,
Rewriting, and Authorship from Macrobius to Medieval Romance, “rewriting . . . is
the sphere within which medieval writers in the scholastic tradition sought and
achieved originality.”103
Tightly connected to the mouvance and episodic nature of medieval text, the
rewritings were created by bringing together different versions or episodes of the
legend to form new wholes. For example, Martin Gosman noted that all of the
versions of the Romance d’Alixandre can be described as a phenomenon of permanent
rewriting.104 In the case of the Alexander’s tale, the “wonders” section was “full of

98 PAUL ZUMTHOR, SPEAKING OF THE MIDDLE AGES 96 (1986) (describing this phenomenon as
“mouvance”).
99 DOUGLAS KELLY, THE ART OF MEDIEVAL FRENCH ROMANCE 68 (1992).
100 PETER BURKE, POPULAR CULTURE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 124 (1978).
101 KARL KROEBER, RETELLING/REREADING: THE FATE OF STORYTELLING IN MODERN TIMES 78
(1992); see also BRADBURY, supra note 96, at 4.
102 MARIE DE FRANCE, LAIS, at Prologue l. 16.
103 KELLY, supra note 30, at xiii.
104 Martin Gosman, Le ‘Roman d’Alixandre’ et ses versions du XII siècle:
une rèècriture
permanente, 13 BIEN DIRE ET BIEN APRANDRE 7 (1996).
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fossilized reminders of older stories and enticing kernels of future stories.” 105 The
next teller would pick them up or drop them as irrelevant, according to the
environment in which the new retelling was to be told. Inserting and adapting
antecedent material into the new work formed the amalgamation of the different
versions of the legend of Alexander. Pieces from vernacular lyric and other genres
were inserted into romance narrative. A new work was created from the adaption
and development of those borrowed elements through a bele conjointure—the
blending of matters that are aesthetically pleasing and meaningful. 106 The
phenomenon of romance conjointure is thus described “as a montage or even a
collage.”107
As earlier anticipated when discussing Saint Bonaventure’s vision of authorship,
in ancient and medieval creativity, the line between author and rewriter was often
blurred. The roles were often interchangeable. For Macrobius, Virgil was a
consummate, and sublime, rewriter of Homer and other earlier Roman authors. 108
Virgil himself became an author in its full sense when he was imitated and
rewritten. Again, the author of the medieval Roman d’Eneas was an imitator of
Virgil, but also an intermediary auctor for Erec et Enide of Chrétien de Troyes, who
was himself therefore a rewriter of the Roman d’Eneas and many other Latin, French
and Celtic models and an auctor for the writers who followed him, especially the
continuators of his romance of Perceval.109 In a very circular way, imitation was the
source of authority and made authority worth of being imitated. Hitting this very
point, John of Salisbury commented in the late twelfth century on Macrobius’
influence by noting that “[h]e succeeded in making those who imitated earlier writers
themselves imitable.” 110 The recurrence of writing and rewriting generated a
powerful creative force that created the millennial epic tradition.
As Chrétien explained during his testimony, accretion, retelling, and reelaboration laid the foundations of the Arthurian Romance. Roger Sherman Loomis,
one of the foremost authorities on medieval and Arthurian literature, wrote in his
most notable book Arthurian Tradition and Chrétien de Troyes: “it appears that the
Matiére de Bretagne is a cumulative creation.” 111 According to Loomis, the oral
tradition ignited a long course of development at the end of which stands the
Arthurian romance and Chrétien de Troyes’ works. A similar process led to the
development of the Homeric tales and Germanic legends, such as Beowulf and the
Nibelungenlied. Evocatively, Loomis describes the similar origin of these three forms
of traditional literature by noting:
The rhapsodes and their relation to “homer,” the scops and their relation to
Beowulf, would offer close parallels to the Welsh cyvarwyddon and the
Id. at 164.
Id. at 214.
107 Id.
108 See, e.g., MACROBIUS, supra note 52, at 290–343 (Macrobius “quot[ed] actual lines of Homer
which Virgil has translated almost word for word.”).
109 See KELLY, supra note 30, at 58, 171–212.
110 John of Salisbury, Metalogicon I.24.84–85, as cited in KELLY, supra note 30, at 58, 171–212.
111 ROGER S. LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN TRADITION AND CHRÉTIEN DE TROYES 38 (1961) [hereinafter
LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN TRADITION].
105
106

[13:341 2014]
Rediscovering Cumulative Creativity From the
Oral Formulaic Tradition to Digital Remix: Can I Get a Witness?

361

Breton conteurs and their relation to the work of Chrétien. In all three
cases the poet is the inheritor of an age old body of stories, set in far-off
times and places, preserved for generations by itinerant reciters.112
Welsh or Celtic legends first developed the story, and bards sang it from place to
place.113 In the ninth century, the work of Nennius further shaped the story that was
later solidified by Geoffrey of Monmouth in his twelfth-century Historia Regum
Britanniae.114 Putting together some scanty oral and written sources, Geoffrey de
Monmouth highly fictionalized the story of Arthur to the extent that even in the
twelfth century he was denounced as a forger. 115 Several years later, from Normandy,
Worcestershire, and Provençe respectively, Wace, Layamon, and Chrétien de Troyes
elaborated the story. In 1155, Wace simply adapted the Historia of Geoffrey in the
first Arthurian Romance, the Roman de Brut.116 Layamon or Harley took up Wace’s
French version and put it into English verse.117 By the end of the twelfth century,
Chrétien reworked the Arthurian materials and characters, perhaps adding the story
of the Grail himself or deriving it from an ancient manuscript received from his
patron, as he claimed.118 Meanwhile, the characters of the Arthurian legend spread
throughout Europe.119 In the early twelfth century, the story of Queen Guinevere
featured on the tympanum of the Cathedral of Modena. 120 It is a question whether
these sculptures would have been seized and destroyed had Warner Bros. owned the
rights in Geoffrey or Wace’s work. After all, Warner Bros. has brought a lawsuit
against an Indian group constructing a giant replica of Harry Potter’s Hogwarts
during a Hindu religious festival in Kolkata. 121
In the thirteenth century, the Arthurian cycle came to center on Lancelot and on
the story of the Grail, as sketched out in Perceval, the last of Chretien’s Arthurian
Id. at 39.
See DEREK ALBERT PEARSALL, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 3–6 (2003);
ROGER S. LOOMIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARTHURIAN ROMANCE 16–22 (2000) [hereinafter
LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE].
114 See GEOFFREY DE MONMOUTH, HISTORIA REGUM BRITANNIAE (c. 1138) [THE HISTORY OF
THE KINGS OF BRITTANY]; Françoise Le Saux & Peter Damian-Grint, The Arthur of the Chronicles,
in THE ARTHUR OF THE FRENCH: THE ARTHURIAN LEGEND IN MEDIEVAL FRENCH AND OCCITAN
LITERATURE 93–96 (Glyn Sheridan Burgess & Karen Pratt eds., 2006) [hereinafter THE ARTHUR OF
THE FRENCH]; PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 6–13; LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE, supra note 113,
at 34–39.
115 See MARTIN, supra note 28, at 162; PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 8 (noting that the Historia
of Geoffrey was “an amazing feat of invention”).
116 See Le Saux & Damian-Grint, supra note 114, at 96–101; PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 13–
15.
117 See PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 16; LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE, supra note 113, at 40–
43.
118 See MARTIN, supra note 28, at 162; LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN TRADITION, supra note 111, at 12–
24, 25–38 (discussing Chrétien sources at length throughout the book).
119 LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN TRADITION, supra note 111, at 48–50.
120 See MARTIN, supra note 28, at 162; PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 49 (noting that “subjects
from Arthurian romance were also favorites throughout Europe in all forms of interior decoration,
furnishings and objects d’art”).
121 See Hindu Hogwarts Casts Bad Spell on Rowling, METRO (Oct. 12, 2007), http://metro.co.uk/
2007/10/12/hindu-hogwarts-casts-bad-spell-on-rowling-256573/.
112
113
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romances.122 The romance of Perceval strikingly exemplifies the tradition of reuse,
recurrence, and cumulative creativity in medieval romance literature. At least four
continuations followed the original Chrétien de Troyes’s Le Conte du Graal, typically
designated as Perceval, written across a decade between 1181 and 1191. 123 From the
late twelfth century to circa 1250, an anonymous writer, Wauchier de Denain,
Manessier, and Gerbert de Montreuil wrote the four continuations. Each text and
rewriting took over where others left off by developing a theme mentioned in the
earlier version or reinventing the role of a character or place. 124 The many Grail
romances that rewrote Chrétien’s seminal text, which originally appropriated that
which was already written, should be considered as forming a coherent whole. 125 In
this sense, the Perceval saga should be seen as an expression of collective and
collaborative authorship.126
Indeed, the continuations were just one of the many responses generated by
Chrétien’s works. Robert de Boron would develop the symbolism of the Grail, first
adumbrated by Chretien, in Joseph d’Arimathie and his own Perceval now lost.127
The same author gave a life of his own to Merlin in a romance with the same title. 128
Again, the Elucidation and the Bliocadran are short early thirteenth-century
prequels to Chretien’s Perceval.129 From Britain to France, the Arthurian romances
soon reached Germany. The Swiss priest Ulrich von Zatzikhoven translated and
adapted Chretien’s Lancelot into the German verse romance Lanzelet, including the
whereabouts of the hero’s childhood. 130 A few years later, rewriting Chretien’s
Perceval, Wolfram von Eschenbach would come up with his own Parzival, one of the
masterpieces of medieval Arthurian Romance. 131

122 See FERDINAND LOT, ETUDE SUR LE LANCELOT EN PROSE (1954), as cited in MARTIN, supra
note 28, at 162.
123 See Matilda Tomaryn Bruckner, Authorial Relays: Continuing Chrétien’s Conte du Graal,
in THE MEDIEVAL AUTHOR IN MEDIEVAL FRENCH LITERATURE 13–28 (Virginie E. Greene ed., 2006)
[hereinafter Bruckner, Authorial Relays]; MATILDA TOMARYN BRUCKNER, CHRÉTIEN CONTINUED: A
STUDY OF THE CONTE DU GRAAL AND ITS VERSE CONTINUATIONS (2009) [hereinafter BRUCKNER,
CHRÉTIEN CONTINUED]; Rupert T. Pickens, Keith Busby, & Andrea M. Williams, Perceval and the
Grail: the Continuations, Robert de Boron and Perlesvaus, in THE ARTHUR OF THE FRENCH, supra
note 114, at 93–96 (GLYN SHERIDAN BURGESS AND KAREN PRATT EDS., U. Wales Press 2006);
PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 36–39.
124 Bruckner, Authorial Relays, supra note 123, at 22.
It mentioned the role of the Mont
Dolerous, which was one of the adventures announced at Arthur’s court before the knights disperse
in search of the Grail in Chrétien’s romance. Id. It was then reinvented in some of the
continuations, marking the opening and closing moment of Wauchier’s continuation. Id.
125 Id. at 14, 18.
126 Cf. id. at 17.
127 See Bruckner, Authorial Relays, supra note 123, at 12; Pickens, Busby, & Williams, supra
note 123, at 260–68; PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 40–41; LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE, supra
note 113, at 114–19.
128 See PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 40. In fact, Boron’s Merlin was indebted to an earlier Vita
Merlini by Geoffrey de Monmouth and his Historia. See GEOFFREY DE MONMOUTH, THE LIFE OF
MERLIN, VITA MERLINI (John Jay Parry trans., 2008); Le Saux & Damian-Grint, supra note 114, at
95, 108 n.4; LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE supra note 113, at 39–40, 124–30.
129 See Pickens, Busby, & Williams, supra note 123, at 215–21.
130 See PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 50–51.
131 Id. at 51; LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE, supra note 113, at 67–74.
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Meanwhile, Arthurian verse romances were turned into prose romances. At the
beginning of the thirteenth century, clerical appropriation of the Arthurian and Grail
themes with religious purposes emerged as well. They appeared in prose Grailromances, such as Perlesvaus and Didot Perceval.132 Between 1215 and 1230, the
expanding mass of stories was gathered together into a single chronological cycle by
numerous authors and compilers. The “Vulgate” cycle of Arthurian prose romance,
as this unifying work is known, includes the Prose Lancelot, its sequel the Queste del
Saint Grail, and the Mort le roi Artu and its prequels Estoire del Saint Graal and
Estoire de Merlin, partly derived from Robert de Boron’s works. 133 The Vulgate Cycle
of Arthurian Prose romances was re-written shortly after his composition by an
author who combined it with themes derived from the prose Tristan,134 another hero
that was now living a life on his own and whose story went through numerous
adaptations, transformations, and rewritings. 135
Again, certain anonymous
remanieurs also remodeled in part the Vulgate Cycle of Arthurian prose romances by
including a so-called Livre d’Artus, which introduced new incidents and characters,
provided references and details explaining several incidents left so far unanswered,
and brought to a conclusion certain themes referred to in the Arthurian corpus as
developed up to that point. 136 Starting from 1235, anonymous authors, attracting
then continuators and remanieurs, took to the next level the derivative reuse of
characters and themes by adding the tale of one or more generations. 137 For
instance, Gurion le Courtois was a pre-Arthurian chronicle telling the stories of the
fathers of the Arthurian heroes, whereas Ysaÿe le Triste recounted the story of the

132 See BRUCKNER, CHRÉTIEN CONTINUED, supra note 123, at 12–15; Pickens, Busby, &
Williams, supra note 123, at 269–73; PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 42–43.
133 See Elspeth Kennedy et al., Lancelot with and without Grail: Lancelot do Lac and the
Vulgate Cycle, in THE ARTHUR OF THE FRENCH, supra note 114, at 274–324; PEARSALL, supra note
113, at 43–48; LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE, supra note 113, at 92–111; Jean Frappier, The
Vulgate Cycle, in ARTHURIAN LITERATURE IN THE MIDDLE AGES: A COLLABORATIVE HISTORY, 316
(Roger S. Loomis ed., 1959) (writing of the “enigma” of the Lancelot-Grail cycle, and referring to a
work that by its very size, scope, diversity, and intricacy seemed to defy any attempt to situate its
creation in the hands of a single author while at the same time demonstrating a cohesion that could
not be the result of mere chance).
134 See Fanni Bogdanow & Richard Trachsel, Rewriting Prose Romance:
The Post-Vulgate
Roman Du Graal and Related Texts, in THE ARTHUR OF THE FRENCH, supra note 114.
135 Starting with Tristan of Thomas and a slightly later version by Béroul, dating
approximately between 1160 and 1170, the legend of Tristan was extensively expanded. Circa 1210,
Gottfried von Strassburg masterfully crystalized the story of the hero in his own Tristan. See
PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 52; LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE, supra note 113, at 74–79. Later,
Le Roman de Tristan de Léonois or Tristan en prose [the prose Tristan] merged the story of Tristan
into the Arthurian saga and adapted it into prose in the fashion of the ‘Vulgate’ Cycle. Emmanuéle
Baumgartner, The prose Tristan, in THE ARTHUR OF THE FRENCH, supra note 114. Also the prose
Tristan, composed between 1230 and 1235, appears to be a work of collaborative authorship with
one Hélie the Boron continuing, or more probably revising and amplifying a text left by a writer
using the pseudonym Luce de Gaut. In fact, some manuscripts still include an epilogue in which
Hélie reports that he has assembled “all that was left by my lord Luces de Gaut, who first begun the
translation, by Master Gautier Map, who wrote the book centered on Lancelot [the ‘Lancelot
proper’], and by my lord Robert de Boron.” Id. at 325–26.
136 See Bogdanow & Trachsel, supra note 134, at 357–64.
137 Id. at 364–67.
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sons of the Knights of the Round Table after the death of Arthur.138 The public knew
some of these characters since the Chrétien’s Romances, but others were introduced
anew. They soon became common heritage at the free disposal of other writers, who
interpolated parts of the Gurion romance back into the original Arthurian stories.139
This account of the history of medieval Arthurian literature is only a preview of
the amazing creative explosion that detonated all over Europe in less than a century
through continuations, adaptations, translations, interpolations, and rewritings of
the Arthurian saga. In the romance literature, open reuse and borrowing of iconic
characters and related themes promoted relentless creative inspiration. Arthur,
Lancelot, Guinevere, Perceval, Gauvain, Yvain, Merlin, and Tristan were endlessly
exploited, reinvented, and transformed, while they traveled from Britain to France,
Germany, and then back again to Britain. Their stories were continuously reworked
or continued. Each rewriter, continuator, translator, and compiler added new
details. By slow accretion, these new details grew into a new picture. They became
the story as we know it now. Chretien’s or Robert de Boron’s narrative, which was
extensively plundered by the many that came after them, 140 turned into something
they would have hardly expected. Chrétien himself, however, sang the powerful
creative beauty of joining together, mashing up, and reworking borrowed characters,
themes, and motifs. He was a rewriter before being rewritten.141 To Chrétien writing
was to draw from a tale of adventure “une mout bele conjointure.”142 The whole
history of the Arthurian romance is that of recursive beautiful conjunctions. From
the intersections of previous borrowed story-lines and episodes, new stories were
born, old stories were reinvigorated, and the cumulative mouvance of old and new,
original and derivative, faded away into “the story.” As Roger Loomis hinted at in

Id. at 364, 366.
Id. at 365.
140 See BEATE SCHMOLKE-HASSELMANN, THE EVOLUTION OF ARTHURIAN ROMANCE:
THE
VERSE TRADITION FROM CHRÉTIEN TO FROISSART 181–220 (1998) (discussing at length borrowings,
plagiarism and dependence of later writers from Chrétien and providing examples of mutatio à la
Macrobius in Arthurian romance).
141 That Chrétien did not create his plots is stressed more than once by Roger Loomis. See
LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE, supra note 113, at 66; LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN TRADITION, supra note
111, at 11 (noting that “by his own account, [Chrétien] did not create his plots . . . he derived the
main outlines at least of the four romances from tales familiar to his readers; the tales were
commonly recited by professionals before aristocratic audiences; some versions were valued so
highly as to be set down in manuscript in prose”).
142 CHRÉTIEN DE TROYES, EREC ET ENIDE Prologue, l. 10–14 (William W. Comfort trans., 1919);
see also Douglas Kelly, Chrétien de Troyes, in THE ARTHUR OF THE FRENCH, supra note 114, at 156–
62, 156. Kelly wrote:
138
139

[T]he combination of two or more entities is a conjuncture . . . [t]he Erec passage
fits this meaning when Chrétien says that he draws his conjuncture from a tale,
thus suggesting that he is lifting parts from the tale or from a number of different
versions of a tale, and recombining them in a new version.
Id.
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the title of one fundamental text on the subject, the Arthurian Romance is a
“collaborative history.”143
F. Ludovico Ariosto’s Testimony: From the Chanson to the Frenzy of Roland
Ludovico Ariosto (1474–1533), the Italian author of the Renaissance masterpiece
Orlando Furioso [The Frenzy of Roland] (1516), brought his testimony as well.
Ariosto explained that his great work was the result of a cumulative tradition
building upon an endless line of rewritings, borrowings, and open reuses that have
characterized the chanson de geste, and especially the Chanson de Roland.
The Chanson de Roland is the most celebrated of Old French chansons de geste,
which sung of the epic “deeds” of a hero. The Chanson de Roland recounts the story
of Roland, Charlemagne’s nephew. Jongleurs carried the Chanson de Roland far and
wide, from France to England, Italy, Germany, and Spain. The formulaic language
seems to indicate an oral origin for the Chanson de Roland.144 Even if we assume
that the Chanson the Roland was the result of an anonymous writer of genius—a
remanieur de genie—coming into contact with the oral tradition,145 the work is the
product of “elaboration over [a few] centuries by hundreds, perhaps even thousands,
of poets.”146 As Joseph Duggan noted, the poem should not be treated “as a monolith,
but rather as a work which passed through a long process of continual creation before
being written down in the Oxford manuscript.” 147 In fact, Duggan continued, “the
normal way for narrative songs to grow from simple chants d’actualité to true epics,
in both proportion and scope, is precisely through a process of multisecular
accretion.”148
One defining character of chansons de geste is that they went through a process
of so-called “cyclization.”149 This process revolved around the role of iconic characters
143 ARTHURIAN LITERATURE IN THE MIDDLE AGES:
A COLLABORATIVE HISTORY (Roger S.
Loomis ed., 1959).
144 See LORD, supra note 13, at 198 (“The Chanson is formulaic beyond any question . . . [s]uch
analyses seem to indicate that the Chanson as we have it in the Oxford manuscript is an oral
composition.”); JOSEPH J. DUGGAN, THE SONG OF ROLAND: FORMULAIC STYLE AND POETIC CRAFT
16–62, 34–35, 159 (1973) (noting that “indeed Roland is one of the more formulaic works
examined”).
145 DE VRIES, supra note 4, at 32. De Vries argued:

[I]f we are inclined to consider the Song of Roland as the end of a very long and
literary development, and not at all as a masterpiece that suddenly sprung up out
of nothing, this does not mean that we wish to degrade the poet to a remanieur of
an older text.
Id. But see DUGGAN, supra note 144, at 101 (“We are left with but one cogent possibility supported
by concrete evidence: the Roland which we possess must be a very nearly unadulterated product of
oral tradition.”).
146 DUGGAN, supra note 144, at 101.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 75.
149 See Finn E. Sinclair, The chanson de geste, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF FRENCH
LITERATURE 29 (William Burgwinkle, Nicholas Hammond, & Emma Wilson eds., 2011); CATHERINE
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or groups of characters promoting the formation of “cycles.” Meeting the request of
the public, singers, jongleurs, and authors created poetic and legendary genealogies
of the most successful heroes. By the middle of the twelfth century, new chanson
sprang out from the original poems to sing the earlier or later adventures of the
heroes, their ancestors and descendants. Three main cycles have acquired specific
prominence, as famously grouped by Bertrand de Bar-sur Abe in his Girart de
Vienne, a chanson written in the late twelfth century: 1) the geste du roi, telling the
deeds of Charlemagne or a hero from his lineage, usually his nephew Roland; 2) the
geste de Garin de Monglane, having as a central character Guillame d’Orange,
supposedly the great-grand son of Garin; and 3) the geste de Doon de Mayence,
concerning traitors and rebels against the royal power and centering on the
characters of Renaud de Montauban and Girart de Roussillon.150
The figure of Roland, together with his companion Olivier and the magic horse
Bayard, which is dominant in the geste de roi cycle, also recurred constantly in the
songs of other cycles. Roland played the role of protagonist in several adventures
preceding the battle of Roncesvalles, such as those told in the Chanson d’Aspremont,
Otinel, or Entrée d’Espagne.151 In other songs, Roland was portrayed as one of the
leading knights in Charlemagne’s court. In Girart de Vienne, which was part of the
geste de Garin de Monglan cycle, the first encounter between Roland and Olivier was
described in connection with a duel of the two heroes near Vienne, after which
Roland and Olivier swore eternal friendship.152 Meanwhile, the story of Roland was:
1) adapted into Southern Occitan speaking France, such as in Rollan a Saragossa
and Ronsasvals; 2) translated and adapted into the German Rolandslied by Konrad
der Pfaffe, the Spanish Roncesvalles, and the Old Norse Karlamagnús saga; 3)
developed and re-elaborated by the Italian literature; 4) adapted into prose in many
languages with enormous success; and 5) visually translated into the Sicilian Pupi
theater. For another example of cross-country rewriting, circulation, and influence,
the unfinished thirteenth-century German epic Willehalm by the poet Wolfram von
Eschenbach was based on the French chanson Aliscans. It expanded and adapted
the earlier Chanson de Guillaume, perhaps the oldest song of the geste de Garin de
Monglane cycle.153 Through the endless line of retellings, translations, variants, and
rearrangements, the story was transformed and expanded with the inclusion of new
characters, the modification of the old and the emergence of new scenarios, elements,
and episodes, potentially open to new retellings. Roland, as well as the heroes of the

BATES, THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE EPICS 70 (2010); LUKE SUNDERLAND, OLD FRENCH
NARRATIVE CYCLES: HEROISM BETWEEN ETHICS AND MORALITY 1–22 (2010).
150 See Bertrand de Bar-sur Abe, Girart de Vienne l. 8–67, in THE SONG OF GIRART OF VIENNE
BY BERTRAND DE BAR-SUR-AUBE: A TWELFTH-CENTURY CHANSON DE GESTE (Michael A. Newth
trans., 1999).
151 See WILLIAM W. KIBLER, MEDIEVAL FRANCE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 508 (1995); URBAN T.
HOLMES, A HISTORY OF OLD FRENCH LITERATURE: FROM THE ORIGINS TO 1300 83 (1962).
152 Bertrand de Bar-sur Abe, supra note 150, at l. 5606–662.
153 See Martin H. Jones & Timothy McFarland, Introduction, in WOLFRAM’S “WILLEHALM”:
FIFTEEN ESSAYS xiii–xvii (Martin H. Jones & Timothy McFarland eds., 2002); Martin H. Jones, The
Depiction of Battle in Wolfram von Eschenbach’s Willehalm, in THE IDEALS AND PRACTICE OF
MEDIEVAL KNIGHTHOOD II: PAPERS FROM THE THIRD STRAWBERRY HILL CONFERENCE 46–47 (1988).
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other cycles, witnessed a process of slow transformation and adaptation to the
changing cultural and literary landscape. As Finn Sinclair highlighted:
The essential point to note here is that epic texts, by their very nature as
texts spanning the oral/literary divide, were subject to mouvance—that is,
to reinvention, renewal and rewriting. Even if they were composed as
integral poems, their subsequent dissemination through singing and
performance, and through repeated copying over the years, produced living
texts, open to transformation and regeneration in response to their
changing context.154
Singers and jongleurs, and later literary authors, would pick the new themes
and turn them into new cycles, possibly leading to new masterpieces and the
emergence of new genres at some point along the line of retellings. In the fourteenthcentury Franco-Venetian Entrée d’Espagne, for example, Roland would become an
errant knight, borrowing this motif from the increasingly successful Arthurian
Romances and setting the background for the Italian epic of the late fifteenth century
and early sixteenth century.155
The proliferation of a tradition of living texts that have been inspired by process
of regeneration, continuations, and rewriting—which developed around the open
reuse of characters and themes of the Chanson de Roland and chanson de geste at the
intersection of oral and literary tradition—was finally crystallized and reaffirmed in
one of the last literary masterpieces of the Western Renaissance. Ariosto’s Orlando
Furioso is an extraordinary example of cumulative and collaborative creativity that
modern copyright policies would thwart.
Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso was a
continuation of Matteo Maria Boiardo’s unfinished Orlando Innamorato (1495)—
Roland in Love.156 Boiardo’s work at once drew characters, themes, and parodistic
inspiration from Luigi Pulci’s Morgante (1478–1483).157 Pulci, in fact, has supposedly
reworked an anonymous fourteenth-century Orlando in the first part of his poem and
based the last five cantos of his romance on La Spagna in ottava rima, a midfourteenth-century adaptation and rewriting of the Entrée d’Espagne. 158 Ariosto,
Boiardo, and Pulci all adapted a twelfth century Old French chanson de geste known
as Les Quatre Fils Aymon—The Four Sons of Aymon, frequently referred to simply
as the tale of Renaud de Montauban—and mashed it up with the Chanson de Roland
and later variations. Ariosto invited other writers to continue the story of Angelica
Sinclair, supra note 149, at 28.
See ANONIMO PADOVANO [ANONYMOUS FROM PADUA], L’ENTRÉE D’ESPAGNE: ROLANDO DA
PAMPLONA ALL’ORIENTE [THE ENTRÉE D’ESPAGNE: ROLAND FROM PAMPLONA TO THE FAR EAST]
(2011); NICOLÒ DA VERONA, CONTINUAZIONE DELL’ENTRÉE D’ESPAGNE (1992) (continuing the
narration left unfinished in the Entrée d’Espagne to reach close to the happenings told in the
Chanson the Roland).
156 See MATTEO MARIA BOIARDO, ORLANDO INNAMORATO (Charles S. Ross trans. & ed., 2004).
157 See LUIGI PULCI, MORGANTE: THE EPIC ADVENTURES OF ORLANDO AND HIS GIANT FRIEND
(Joseph Tusiani trans., Edoardo Lèbano ed., 1998).
158 See JANE E. EVERSON, THE ITALIAN ROMANCE EPIC IN THE AGE OF HUMANISM:
THE
MATTER OF ITALY AND THE WORLD OF ROME 30 n.5 (2001); CONSTANCE JORDAN, PULCI’S MORGANTE:
POETRY AND HISTORY IN FIFTEENTH-CENTURY FLORENCE 46 (1986).
154
155
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with the verse “forse altri canterà con miglior plettro.”159 The invitation was not left
unheard and several sequels were produced in Italian and Spanish. 160
G. Shakespeare Testimony: Plagiarism, Feathers, and Crows
The Immortal Bard, Shakespeare, could not be missing from the catalogue of
artists and authors willing to support Chuck D’s case. Robert Greene described his
younger contemporary, Shakespeare, as “an upstart crow beautified with our
feathers.”161 Resenting Shakespeare for dipping too far into his Pandosto for The
Winter’s Tale, 162 or perhaps after assisting a performance of Henry VI, 163 Greene
warned other writers to abandon playwriting because Shakespeare “with his Tygers
hart wrapt in a Players hyde, supposes he is . . . an absolute Johannes fac totum, is
in his owne conceit the onely Shake-scene in a countrey.” 164 And, indeed,
Shakespeare was, in modern terms, a plagiarist on a vast scale. According to Malone,
out of 6,033 lines of parts I, II, and III of Henry VI, Shakespeare copied 1,771
verbatim and paraphrased 2,373. 165 Whole passages of Antony and Cleopatra, to
take just one example, were line-by-line versifications of prose historical works. 166
Again, in The Tempest, Gonzalo’s description of the ideal state was a word-for-word
transposition of Michel de Montaigne’s essays Of the Cannibals, as translated by
John Florio in 1603.167 Modern copyright laws might conceivably have stifled almost
all of Shakespeare’s works at birth because they ‘stole’ from Raphael Holinshed’s and
Edward Hall’s prose histories of England, Thomas North’s translation of Plutarch,

LUDOVICO ARIOSTO, ORLANDO FURIOSO, XXX.16 l. 8 (William S. Rose trans., 2006)
(“Perchance some voice in happier verse may sing.”).
160 See DAVID QUINT, ORIGIN AND ORIGINALITY IN RENAISSANCE LITERATURE: VERSIONS OF
THE SOURCE 4 (1983).
161 ROBERT GREENE, GROATSWORTH OF WIT:
BOUGHT WITH A MILLION OF REPENTANCE:
DESCRIBING THE FOLLY OF YOUTH, THE FALSEHOOD OF MAKE-SHIFT FLATTERERS, THE MISERY OF
THE NEGLIGENT, AND MISCHIEFS OF DECEIVING COURTESANS, WRITTEN BEFORE HIS DEATH, AND
PUBLISHED AT HIS DYING REQUEST 83 (1919); see also TERENCE SCHOONE-JONGEN, SHAKESPEARE’S
COMPANIES: WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE’S EARLY CAREER AND THE ACTING COMPANIES, 1577–1594 18–
21 (2008) (discussing the interpretation of Greene’s passage); ALEXANDRA HALASZ, THE
MARKETPLACE OF PRINT: PAMPHLETS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (1997).
162 See ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY 75 (1952).
163 See ILYA GILIOV, THE SHAKESPEARE GAME: THE MYSTERY OF THE GREAT PHOENIX 120
(2003) (In fact, Greene’s passage seems to parody a quotation in the third part of Henry VI: “Tygers
hart wrapt in a woman’s hyde.”).
164 GREENE, supra note 161, at 83–85.
165 See LINDEY, supra note 162, at 75.
166 See William St Clair, Metaphors of Intellectual Property, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY,
ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 384 (Ronan Deazley, Martin Kretschmer, & Lionel Bently
eds., 2010); MARGRETA DEGRAZIA, SHAKESPEARE VERBATIM 132–76 (1991).
167 See Michel de Montaigne, On Cannibals, in MONTAIGNE’S ESSAYS I 30 (John Florio trans.,
1603), available at http://www.luminarium.org/renascence-editions/montaigne/1xxx.htm; William
Shakespeare, The Tempest, in THE DRAMATIC WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE: FROM THE TEXT OF
JOHNSON AND STEEVENS 8 (1836); SAMUEL R. DELANY, LONGER VIEWS: EXTENDED ESSAYS 225
(1996); LINDEY, supra note 162, at 74–75.
159
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Arthur Brooke’s poem Romeo and Juliet, Chapman’s Homer, Golding’s Ovid, and
many others.168
The extensive—and unacknowledged—appropriations of Shakespeare were
commonplace in early modern England. It was especially common in drama,
although it was widespread in all literary fields.169 The Mock Astrologer of Dryden is
a manifesto of proud plagiarism, and self-conscious reuse of others’ plots and stories.
In the prologue of the play, Dryden laid down his own apologia of plagiarism:
I am tax’d with stealing all my Playes. . . . ‘Tis true, that where ever I have
lik’d any story in a Romance, Novel or forreign Play, I have made no
difficulty, nor ever shall, to take the foundation of it, to build it up, and to
make it proper for the English stage.170
In writing his play, Dryden had drawn on Pedro Calderón de la Barca’s El
Astrologo Fingido and Thomas Corneille’s Le Feint Astrologue, from which, by
Dryden own admission, he “rejected some adventures . . . [and] heightened those
which [he has] chosen; and . . . added others which were neither in the French or
Spanish.”171 In a quest for perfection among giants of the stage, Calderon, Corneille,
and Dryden’s plays each imitated those of the predecessor’s, each separated by
twenty years. This very successful pattern of re-use would be impossible under
modern copyright policies.
Borrowing flourished in sixteenth-century England to such an extent that Sir
Sidney Lee noted that “[t]he full story of the Elizabethan sonnet is, for the most part,
a suggestive chapter in the literary records of plagiarism.” 172 Even the greatest of
the Elizabethan sonneteers transcribed the language and the sentiments of popular
French and Italian poetry. 173 Plagiarism was not at all considered a creative
mischief. As Harold White noted, “[n]ot only were Englishmen from 1500 to 1625
without any feeling analogous to the modern attitude toward plagiarism; they even
lacked the word until the very end of that period.” 174

168 See Nick Groom, Forgery, Plagiarism, Imitation, Pegleggery, in PLAGIARISM IN EARLY
MODERN ENGLAND, supra note 74, at 79.
169 See PAULINA KEWES, AUTHORSHIP AND APPROPRIATION:
WRITING FOR THE STAGE IN
ENGLAND 1660–1710 (1998) [hereinafter KEWES, AUTHORSHIP AND APPROPRIATION]; Paulina Kewes,
“A Play, Which I Presume to Call Original”: Appropriation, Creative Genius and Eighteenth-Century
Playwriting, 34 STUD. IN THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 17, 17 (2001).
170 John Dryden, Preface to the Mock Astrologer (1671), in THE CRITICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS
PROSE WORKS OF JOHN DRYDEN, NOW FIRST COLLECTED 202 (Edmond Malone ed., 1800).
171 Id. at 203.
172 Sidney Lee, The Elizabethan Sonnet, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE
248 (1918).
173 Id.
174 HAROLD O. WHITE, PLAGIARISM AND IMITATION DURING THE EARLY RENAISSANCE 202
(1935).
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H. Coleridge’s Testimony: The Divine Ventriloquist and the Obsession with Absolute
Originality
Samuel Taylor Coleridge then came in and his testimony shed light on the
process leading to the denial of the cumulative and collaborative nature of creativity.
Trying to accommodate the tension amongst originality, appropriation, and
plagiarism, Coleridge justified one notorious accusation of plagiarism from Schelling
by claiming: “I regard the Truth as a divine Ventriloquist: I care not from whose
mouth the sounds are supposed to proceed, if only the words are audible and
intelligible.”175
From the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a new creative paradigm based
on autogenous originality and invention emerged from the ashes of imitative
practices and erudite borrowing. In a few years, the Statute of Anne would be
enacted. Original authorship was on the rise, and plagiarism was viewed more and
more as a creative mischief. As Martha Woodmansee argued, modern “copyright”
and “authors’ rights” laws are tightly correlated with the emergence of the modern
concept of art in the eighteenth century.176 The new conceptualization of art and
authorship emerged from a markedly different individualistic vision of men. It was a
by-product of a new idea of genius that fully expanded on the evolution earlier
propelled by Dürer and Renaissance super-artists. The construction of the idea of
genius, as an “instinctive and extraordinary capacity for imaginative creation,
original thought, invention or discovery,”177 is said to have originated in England and
to have acquired special prominence in Germany.178 The special focus on originality
and genius rapidly became the field of research of a number of breakthrough works.
Examples include The Conjectures on Original Composition by Edward Young, An
Essay on Genius by Alexander Gerard, and An Essay on Original Genius by William
Duff.179 In his Conjectures, Young made originality the tract of a man of genius. He
rejected imitation, driving it to the periphery of creative efforts: “The mind of a man
of Genius is fertile and pleasant field, pleasant as Elysium, and fertile as Tempe; it
enjoys a perpetual Spring. Of that Spring, Originals are the fairest Flowers:
175 SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA: OR, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF MY
LITERARY LIFE AND OPINIONS 153 (Princeton Univ. Press 1983) (1817). Together with the metaphor
of the “divine ventriloquist,” Coleridge also deployed the phenomenon of ocular spectra and the
concept of the “genial coincidence” to describe his plagiarism. See TILAR J. MAZZEO, PLAGIARISM AND
LITERARY PROPERTY IN THE ROMANTIC PERIOD 26–48 (2007).
176 See MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART AND THE MARKET: Rereading the History of
Aesthetics (1996) (reviewing the German debate over the nature of a book and discussing how the
rise of art in the eighteenth century produced a new aesthetic paradigm and new ideas about artistic
production that got incorporated into, and empowered by, the copyright and authors’ rights laws);
Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the
Emergence of the Author, 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 425–48 (1984).
177 Jonathan Bate, Shakespeare and Original Genius, in GENIUS: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 90
(Penelope Murray ed., 1989).
178 Id.
179 See Edward Young, Conjectures on Original Composition, in a LETTER to the Author of Sir
Charles Grandison (2d ed., 1759); ALEXANDER GERARD, AN ESSAY ON GENIUS (1773); WILLIAM
DUFF, ESSAY ON ORIGINAL GENIUS AND ITS VARIOUS MODES OF EXERTION IN PHILOSOPHY AND THE
FINE ARTS, PARTICULARLY IN POETRY (1767).
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Imitations are of quicker growth, but fainter bloom.”180 Imitation, “the sincerest form
of flattery” to an Elizabethan playwright only a century earlier,181 was driven to the
periphery of creativity. Plagiarism became a “sordid Theft” to be ruled out
altogether, as Young wondered “[h]ope we, from Plagiarism, any Dominion in
Literature; as that of Rome arose from a nest of Thieves?”182
However, Young still related the creative act of a genius to some invisible divine
afflatus in accordance with the Ciceronian tradition.183 The last veil before the full
individualistic empowerment of creativity still remained, but not for long. It was at
this time that Alexander Gerard asserted that “genius is properly the faculty of
invention . . . by means of which a man is qualified . . . for producing original works
of art.”184 The power of imagination was a power of the human mind, not a godly
inspiration.185 As Gerard argued, the source of genius was internal, not external.
The exclusion of the external endowment radically changed the perception of
creativity.
Creativity became purely individual, a personal experience.
Communitarian participation was suddenly excluded from the process of creative
production.
In this respect, the presence of an external divine endowment kept in place a
model of open reuse, exchange and sharing of others’ creativity. If a gift was given to
the author, he was under obligation to give back to the community some of what he
had received. Imitation, plagiarism, and borrowing were instrumental to return to
the people what God—or the community, if we draw from a perspective where God is
a construction of a community need—had given to the author.186
Kant would later elaborate on Gerard’s insights by arguing that genius properly
consists in the “happy relation” between the faculties of imagination and
understanding. 187 Like Gerard, Kant stressed that the creative moment is an
internal process.188 Kant took a further logical step by crystallizing originality as the
central property of modern aesthetic. An immediate consequence of the fact that
genius “is not a mere aptitude for what can be learned by a rule,” but “a talent for
producing that for which no definite rule can be given,” is Kant’s position that
“originality must be its first property.”189 The romantic author was now fully shaped.
Meanwhile, the demise of imitation, plagiarism, and collaborative creativity was well
on its way. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Hegel would note, “an
ingenious and trivial idea, and a change in external form, is rated so highly as

YOUNG, supra note 179, at 7.
WHITE, supra note 174, at 120.
182 YOUNG, supra note 179, at 15.
183 Id. at 16.
184 GERARD, supra note 179, at 8, 29–32, 39–70 (discussing at length “[h]ow Genius arises from
the Imagination”).
185 Id. at 27–39 (discussing the problem in a section aptly titled “To What Faculty of the Mind,
Genius Properly Belongs”).
186 Cf. Davis, supra note 78, at 87.
187 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft § 49, in KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 202 (J. H. Bernard
trans., 1892).
188 Id. at 188, § 46.
189 Id. at 189.
180
181
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originality and a product of independent thinking that the thought of plagiarism
becomes wholly insufferable.” 190
As Paulina Kewes argued, accusations of plagiarisms spared few authors, and
marked a changing cultural paradigm.191 One of the earliest controversies over the
morality of literary copying and imitation involved two French choreographers. 192 In
1623, François de Lauze embarked on an aggressive campaign to name and shame
one Berthélemy de Montagut, who had stolen his treaty on dancing. The three pages
introducing de Lauze’s Apologie de la danse detailed how an early draft of that very
same book was appropriated by de Montagut and published under the title Louange
de la danse. 193 Although this first attempt to publicly stigmatize an instance of
plagiarism was partially unsuccessful, 194 a changing sensitivity toward the issue was
emerging.195 Modern attitudes to literary property can also be traced in Langbaine’s
Momus Triumphans; or, The Plagiaries of the English Stage. Langbaine’s short book
was an arraignment for theft in English plays, written at the end of the seventeenth
century. After listing sources and analogues of all the published English drama,
Langbaine concluded:
[H]aving read most of our English Plays, as well ancient as those of latter
date, I found that our modern Writers had made Incursions into the
deceas’d Authors Labours, and robb’d them of their Fame. . . . I know that I
cannot do a better service to their memory, than by taking notice of the
Plagiaries, who have been so free to borrow, and to endeavour to vindicate
the Fame of these ancient Authors from whom they took their Spoiles. 196
In the eighteenth century, accusations of plagiarism became commonplace.
Jonson, Pope, Dryden, and Milton all faced accusations of plagiarism. At the very
same time, they appeared to champion the emerging new ideal of original
authorship. 197 The Milton affair exemplifies the transformation of the cultural
190

1967).

GEORG FRIEDRICH WILHELM HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHTS § 69 (Thomas M. Knox trans.,

KEWES, AUTHORSHIP AND APPROPRIATION, supra note 169, at 96–129.
See Barbara Ravelhofer, The Medium of Plagiarism: Rogue Choreographers in Early
Modern London, in PLAGIARISM IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND, supra note 74, at 134–47.
193 See François de Lauze, Apologie de la dance 1–3 (1623), as cited in Ravelhofer, supra note
192, at 139; BERTHÉLEMY DE MONTAGUT, LOUANGE DE LA DANCE (Barbara Ravelhofer ed., 2000).
194 See Ravelhofer, supra note 192, at 138.
195 In this period, the emerging metaphor of paternity of the book by the authors, as employed
by Philip Sidney in his Arcadia or by Cervantes in Don Quixote, is an example of a new discourse of
authorship. See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 38 (1993).
196 Gerard Langbaine, Momus Triumphans: or, The Plagiaries of the English Stage; Expos’d, in
A CATALOGUE A4 (1688); see also KEWES, AUTHORSHIP AND APPROPRIATION, supra note 169, at 96–
129 (discussing Langbaine’s work at length).
197 See generally Ian Donaldson, ‘The Fripperie of Wit”: Jonson and Plagiarism, in PLAGIARISM
IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND supra note 74, at 119–33 (discussing plagiarism in Jonson and
Dryden); Paul Baines, Theft and Poetry and Pope, in PLAGIARISM IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND supra
note 74, at 123–24 (discussing plagiarism in Pope); Richard Terry, In Pleasing Memory of All He
Stole, in PLAGIARISM IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND supra note 74 (discussing plagiarism in Jonson,
Pope and Dryden); KEWES, AUTHORSHIP AND APPROPRIATION, supra note 169, at 54–63 (discussing
appropriative practices in Dryden); LINDEY, supra note 162, at 78–83.
191
192
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landscape. 198 William Lauder manufactured fraudulent charges of plagiarism
against Milton in a series of articles in The Gentleman’s Magazine, later collected in
1750 as An Essay on Milton’s Use and Imitation of the Moderns, in his Paradise Lost.
The alleged plagiarism later proved to be a forgery. Lauder was soon discovered.
But the case stirred up quite a controversy and “the severity of the accusation
indicates an anxiety of originality becoming an obsession, with the concomitant fears
that the sacred well of individual genius can be poisoned or simply drawn dry by
intruders.”199
This obsession grew at the beginning of the nineteenth century, so that public
controversies surrounding plagiarism hit most of the British Romantic authors. In
the early nineteenth century, appropriation strategies had been most famously
associated with Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 200 Coleridge had to face recursive
accusations of plagiarism. 201 In his monumental work, Coleridge: The Damaged
Archangel, Norman Fruman specifically discussed the question of Coleridge’s
unacknowledged sources. Fruman traced the history of the controversy that spanned
for over a century from its origins in the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth
century. 202 Thomas DeQuincey and Wordsworth largely contributed to ignite the
widespread, lasting debate that surrounded Coleridge’s masterpieces such as a Hymn
before Sun-Rise, France: An Ode, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, and the
philosophical works in the Biographia Literaria.203 Wordsworth himself, along with
Shelley or Lord Byron, were later touched by accusations of plagiarism.204
The Romantic obsession with plagiarism trespassed into an attempt to turn a
blind eye on collaboration, assimilation, and the cumulative nature of creativity,
excluding the community altogether from the discourse about creativity. The
excruciating emphasis on Coleridge’s plagiarism, and his alleged exceptionality,
became a way to negate the failure of the Romantic aesthetic ideology that Coleridge,
the father of British Romanticism, seems to represent. In fact, as Mazzeo noted,
Coleridge’s “borrowings contradict the logic of Romanticism: he is the brilliant and
innovative poet who claimed imaginative origins for his work but who borrowed

See generally Groom, supra note 168, at 80–89; Terry, supra note 197, at 184–91.
Groom, supra note 168, at 77; see also Nuno Peixoto de Pinho, Handel and Musical
Borrowing, available
at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/58245691/Handel-and-Musical-Borrowing
(discussing the same obsession with originality in connection with George Frideric Handel’s
“transformative imitation” and noting that “the vast body of literature concerning Handel’s
compositional approach is filled with a wildly disproportionate amount of condemning accusations,
the most serious of which is plagiarism”).
200 See THOMAS MALLON, STOLEN WORDS:
FORAYS INTO THE ORIGINS AND RAVAGES OF
PLAGIARISM 26–40 (1989) (discussing Coleridge plagiarism); MAZZEO, supra note 175, at 17–48;
LINDEY, supra note 162, at 84–85.
201 See MAZZEO, supra note 175, at 191–92 n.12 (providing a detailed account of the most
relevant sources discussing the debate surrounding Coleridge’s plagiarism).
202 See NORMAN FRUMAN, COLERIDGE, THE DAMAGED ARCHANGEL (1971).
203 See MAZZEO, supra note 175, at 18 (discussing Thomas DeQuincey’s four articles in Tait’s
Magazines in 1834, in which Coleridge’s literary debts were cataloged and dissected).
204 Id. at 49–85 (discussing the problem of coterie and oral circulation and issues of plagiarism
as they emerged in the Wordsworth and Shelley household); Id. at 86–121 (focusing on charges of
aesthetic plagiarism levied against Lord Byron), Id. at 144–81 (examining the charges of plagiarism
brought against Wordsworth in The Excursion).
198
199
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covertly from the texts of other writers.” 205 So, although Coleridge was not an
anomaly at all, his plagiarism was stigmatized as exceptional because Coleridge
could be cast “as a damaged individual, consumed by private neuroses” and drug
addiction. 206 The failure of the Romantic ideology of absolute and self-sustaining
originality was denied by presenting Coleridge’s abnormal persona as an evidence of
the abnormality of Coleridge’s authorial persona. The collective, communitarian and
cumulative nature of creativity was sidelined. It was seen as the effect of a blurred
perception of reality from a confused individual. A quintessential example of the
failure of the Romantic aesthetic model is deceitfully re-deployed to help marginalize
the opposing imitative and collaborative paradigm.
Similarly, the treatment of Homer, Ossian, and Shakespeare shows that
Romantic ideology transcended into a fabricated denial of the imitative and
cumulative mechanics of creativity. It turned the evidence of failure of the system
into corroborating assumptions. Perhaps the very notion of original genius was the
result of a misperception. The notion, as originating in England, was molded on the
cardinal example of Shakespeare. 207 Shakespeare’s immense literary reputation
served to propel the wide acceptance of the modern notion of genius. Homer was the
other eminent example of original genius. Homer, perhaps together with the
medieval bard Ossian, served as a model to develop the romantic notion. 208 These
assumptions were most likely misplaced.
There could be much debate and discussion over the nature of creativity of the
three mentioned paradigmatic models. Some of that discussion was explicated in the
preceding pages. While the creativities of Homer, Ossian, and Shakespeare are
considered all but undoubtedly original, these supposedly quintessential models of
original genius reinforce the opposite argument: primitive originality does not exist
in art, but every work depends on prior works. Homer, Ossian, and Shakespeare
tend to deconstruct the myth of absolute originality, rather than strengthen it. In
fact, Homer is most likely a tradition, a true collective author, and the expression of a
cumulative and participative model of creativity. Ossian poses very similar
problems. Even if one denies the eighteenth-century construction of the legendary
Gaelic bard Ossian in the “translations” of James Macpherson, 209 Ossian is the Anon
of Virginia Woolf, and his authorship is by definition a participative community
effort.
There is much debate on whether the genius of Shakespeare lies in primitive
originality or in sublime imitation, borrowing, and reuse. Again, Shakespeare most
likely raises doubts over the possibility of a primitive originality. Shakespeare’s
stories were the result of heavy pillaging on Middle Age and Renaissance popular
tales and classical and modern history. In this sense, Shakespeare was imitative and
wholly unoriginal if we look through the lens of the principles stated in Young’s
Conjectures. As Mark Rose noted, “it would be not wholly inappropriate, I think, to

MAZZEO, supra note 175, at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
207 See Bate, supra note 177, at 77.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 93 (discussing it as a possible conclusion).
205
206
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characterize Shakespeare the playwright . . . in a quasi-medieval manner as a
reteller of tales.”210
Jonathan Bate, one of the major Shakespearian scholars, argued that the
claimed original, rather than imitative, nature of Shakespeare’s genius “is untrue of
course,” because “we now know that Shakespeare read nature through the spectacles
of many books (Ovid’s foremost among them).” Bate reinforced the same point by
noting: “[M]odern scholarship has shown that Shakespeare’s art depended on the
assimilation and refashioning of inherited literary and dramatic tradition.” 211 Rather
than individuality, Bate seems to conclude that communality was the defining
character of Shakespeare’s art:
Genius became a Romantic obsession because it was a conception that
seemed to guarantee individuality. . . . Hamlet may be the archetype of the
individual consciousness, but Shakespeare was not Hamlet. If anything, he
was the archetype of communality, not individuality. . . . By “Shakespeare”
we mean not an individual, but a body of work, and that body was shaped
by many individuals—by Ovid and Shakespeare’s other literary precursors,
by Marlowe and his other dramatic precursors, by the actors of his
company, by the audience without whom no play can be completed.212
The claims that Shakespeare did not write Shakespeare 213 do well to unveil the
misperception of the Romantic obsession with primitive originality. The claimants of
that theory put forward Shakespeare’s plagiarism to prove that others have written
the plays, supposedly those plagiarized. As Boyle noted, discussing these claims,
“[a]fter all, the Immortal Bard would never stoop to copy the works of another. Once
again, originality becomes the key.”214 The modern overprotective copyright system
has been built upon this fabricated denial of the cumulative and imitative nature of
creativity and the misperceptions that it brought about.
Chuck D’s plea to get a witness to support his case for sampling and borrowing
has been heard. Many have responded, but far more could have come. In his
magistral lecture, An Unhurried View of Copyright, Benjamin Kaplan reflected:
[I]f man has any “natural” rights, not the least must be the right to imitate
his fellows, and thus to reap where he has not sown. Education, after all,
proceeds from a kind of mimicry, and “progress,” if it is not entirely an
illusion, depends on generous indulgence of copying. 215

ROSE, supra note 195, at 26.
Bate, supra note 177, at 93.
212 Id. at 94; see also ROSE, supra note 195, at 25.
213 See, e.g., JAMES SHAPIRO, CONTESTED WILL:
WHO WROTE SHAKESPEARE? (2010)
(recounting that among many doubters have been writers and thinkers like Freud, Henry James,
Mark Twain, and Helen Keller).
214 JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 230 n.12 (1996).
215 BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT, REPUBLISHED (AND WITH
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRIENDS) 2 (2005).
210
211
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Waldo Emerson shared a similar view on the ephemeral nature of originality
and noted that:
The originals are not original. There is imitation, model, and suggestion, to
the very archangels, if we knew their history. The first book tyrannizes
over the second. Read Tasso, and you think of Virgil; read Virgil, and you
think of Homer; and Milton forces you to reflect how narrow are the limits
of human invention. The Paradise Lost had never existed but for these
precursors . . . .216
III. TRIAL BRIEF: TURNING CUMULATIVE CREATIVITY INTO A NUISANCE
At first, the witnesses that Chuck D has summoned to support his case, as well
as that of any other modern digital remixer, may have surprised the court. In fact,
who else may have pleaded this case more effectively than Homer and the endless
line of bards and aoidoi he represents? Are not the bits that the court claims Chuck
D stole, that “mineral” he found, the same as the formulae that were reworked over
and over in the oral formulaic tradition and that produced our epic and romance
literature and influenced most of our popular culture? Are not those chunks and bits
of culture that digital creativity would like to re-use and remix, the same as the
“harvest of poetry” that Chaucer gleaned “here and there”?
The review of the process of creating the Iliad and the Odyssey has unveiled the
mechanics of writing epics. It is a powerful example of the productivity of a constant
chain of open re-use of literary stock. The largest part of culture has been produced
under a paradigm where imitation, even plagiarism, and social and collaborative
authorship were constitutional elements of the creative moment. The literary pillars
of Western culture, the Iliad and the Odyssey, were fully forged in the furnace of the
oral-formulaic tradition. Later Medieval epics and romance de geste grew out of that
tradition under the aegis of Macrobius’ art of rewriting and Latin principles of
imitatio. Continuations, free re-use of stories and plots, and remodeling of iconic
figures and characters made romance literature a powerful vehicle propelling crosscountry circulation of culture and the development of modern European languages.
At any step of our cultural history, we are presented with overwhelming evidences
that creativity has strived through cumulative evolution, borrowing, appropriation,
and imitation.
In contrast, modern policies for creativity are engineered in a fashion that
thwart the re-use of information, knowledge, and creativity, rather than facilitate it.
Under the current regime, works are supposedly created as perfect, self-sustaining
artifacts from the moment of their creation. Any modification, derivation, cumulative
addition must secure preventive approval and must be paid off, as if it is a nuisance
for society. This becomes increasingly true as a consequence of extended terms of
protection, expansion of authorship rights, and hurdles involved with clearing
copyrights in order to perform additional reuse. In this sense, commodification of
216 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Quotation and Originality, in IV WORKS OF RALPH WALDO
EMERSON 145 (1876).
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culture and copyright expansion, especially its emphasis on a strictly enforced control
over derivative works, contradicts the very essence of human creativity.
A. Copyright Culture, Clearance Culture and “Feared Uses”
“As virtually any clown can attest, no one owns the idea of making a balloon dog,
and the shape created by twisting a balloon into a dog-like form is part of the public
domain.”217 The appropriation artist Jeff Koons seems to disagree with this. In fact,
the statement cited above comes from a complaint for declaratory relief that the San
Francisco bookstore and art gallery Park Life had to file after Koons threatened
lawsuit for selling a balloon dog-shaped book-end supposedly infringing on Koons’
well-known balloon dog sculptures. 218 Besides the risible claim—that was in fact
easily demolished by the timely expert testimony of Dr. Bozo—the case is telling of
an over-expanding copyright culture threatening judicial enforcement in order to
prevent the use and re-use of the common stock of knowledge. Any use, to which
economic or cultural value is attached, tends to trigger the reaction of alleged
copyright owners. Copyright culture has become so pervasive that even silence may
become a possible ground for reaction.219 A cartoonist may no longer imitate news
crawls parodying Fox News’ right-wing slant because—as Matt Groening, author of
The Simpsons, drily noted—“[i]t might confuse the viewers into thinking it’s real
news.”220 Miscellaneous stories of ordinary copyright madness have multiplied in the
last decade. From rightsholders’ reactions against Girl Scout campfire sing-alongs
and day care facilities distributing sheet music to children, 221 to Sony DMCA’s claims
against the re-engineering robot dog AIBO’s jazz dance, 222 clearance culture practices
have profoundly influenced our cultural landscape. Absent proof of clearance,
filmmakers would be totally unable to insure, screen, or distribute movies.223 It may
even be impossible to clear the rights of a The Simpsons’ clip running on a

217 Complaint at 1, Alexander & Song LLC v. Jeff Koons LLC, No. 4:11-cv-00308 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 20, 2011).
218 Id.
219 See JOANNA DEMERS, STEAL THIS MUSIC: HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AFFECTS
MUSICAL CREATIVITY 6–7 (Univ. of Ga. Press 2006) (referring to legal turmoil following Mike Batt’s
silent track homage to the famous silent piece, John Cage’s 4’33’’).
220 See generally MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 1.
221 See German Music Groups in Copyright Conundrum with Crèches, M&C NEWS (Dec. 28,
2010), http://cs.entertainmentcareers.net/blogs/music/archive/2010/12/30/german-music-groups-incopyright-conundrum-with-creches.aspx.
222 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY 95–99
(2004).
223 See PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, UNTOLD STORIES:
CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS
(2004) available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/sites/default/files/UNTOLDSTORIES_
Report.pdf; Lawrence Lessig, For the Love of Culture, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 26, 2010, available
at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/the-love-culture (discussing, among other related issues,
clearing the rights in filmmaking and telling the decade-long efforts of Grace Guggenheim to clear
all of the rights necessary to produce a digital edition of the movies of her own father, the late
Charles Guggenheim, one of America’s greatest documentarians).
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background TV set, accidentally shot in a documentary about Wagner. 224 The
publishing industry follows almost identical rules and clearance practices. It dictates
which content may reach the marketplace, including whether an author is entitled to
title a novel Panasonic.225
Creative behaviors that—as we have discussed at length—were commonplace
and incentivized for most of human history have become increasingly harder to
undertake today. In fact, the insurmountable hurdles related to the overbroad
expansion of copyright—and its judicial enforcement backed up by the design of
modern copyright law—highly discourage the traditional mechanics of creativity.
Facing the impossibility of distributing the award-winning animated movie Sita
Sings the Blues because of the copyright hurdles stemming from clearing the rights
in 1920s jazz songs used in the movie, the film critic Roger Ebert wonders “[e]ighty
years later . . . [d]on’t the copyright owners realize they are contributing to the
destruction of their property by removing it from knowledge?” 226 Freedom of
expression, and thus our capacity to create cumulative culture, becomes often merely
theoretical:
Copyright’s inconstant, unpredictable free speech safety valves, coupled
with the high cost of litigation, have endangered a “clear it or delete it”
culture in which these gateways intermediaries—and their errors and
omissions insurance carriers—regularly insist that speakers obtain
permissions for all potentially actionable uses, even those that likely do not
infringe.227
As it is engineered, copyright law obliges whoever wants to use protected
material to clear the copyrights by meeting the conditions set by the holder. 228
Backed up by this principle of exclusivity, copyright holders expand their control over
intellectual content through the interaction of concomitant factors. First, the
individual is often practically incapable of clearing the complex bundle of rights
involved in copyrighted content. Second, more and more often, threatening judicial
enforcement becomes a practice transforming copyright protection from a defensive
tool into an offensive weapon hindering, rather than promoting, culture and progress.
The economic hurdles involved in facing a copyright infringement lawsuit are in
themselves a bar to any unlicensed use of the content, whether it is fair or not.

AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 223, at 154–61.
See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1903 (2007) (reporting that when the company Panasonic denied permission, the publisher
demanded the title of the book to be changed); KEMBREW MCLEOD, OWNING CULTURE: AUTHORSHIP,
OWNERSHIP, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW xi–xv (2001) (discussing, with a few powerful
examples, how fair uses are curtailed by threats of lawsuits in academic publishing).
226 Karl Fogel, Comment to Roger Ebert, Having a Wonderful Time, Wish You Could Hear,
ROGER EBERT’S J. (Dec. 23., 2008), http://www.rogerebert.com/rogers-journal/having-a-wonderfultime-wish-you-could-hear (quoting Ebert from an earlier interview).
227 NEIL W. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 65–66 (2008).
228 Rothman, supra note 225, at 1911–917.
224
225
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On first account, statutory damages make it very attractive to sue for copyright
infringement in the United States. 229 Statutory damages can be significantly higher
than the actual damages suffered by the rightsholders.230 This is because statutory
damages compensate rightsholders per work as opposed to compensation for losses.
Under United States copyright law, statutory damages may range from $750 to
$150,000 per work, if willful infringement can be shown. 231 If the last figure is
applied, statutory damages can escalate quickly and get so high that somebody at the
Record Industry Association of America may even believe that copyright
infringement may be worth trillions!232 This astounding amount was demanded by a
few record companies from LimeWire, a company distributing the most downloaded
free peer-to-peer file-sharing client program. 233 The recording industry tried to
stretch statutory damages to their limits, by arguing that Section 504(c)(1) of the
Copyright Act provided for damages for each infringement where more than one
party was liable.234 Wisely enough, the Manhattan federal district court observed,
“[a]s Defendants note, Plaintiffs are suggesting an award that is ‘more money than
the entire music recording industry has made since Edison’s invention of the
phonograph in 1877.’”235
The obscurity of copyright law adds to the problem. Fair use has been described
by the Second Circuit as “the most troublesome [doctrine] in the whole law of
copyright.”236 Similarly, copyright terms have increasingly become an unresolvable
conundrum. The status of one of the most popular American songs, “Happy Birthday
to You,” even deceived Justice Breyer in his dissenting opinion in Eldred v.
Ashcroft237—and after a sixty-eight-page-long article from Robert Brauneis, based on
hundreds of sources almost inaccessible to the layman, perhaps some doubts still
remain.238 The inherent complexity and unpredictability of fair use decisions in the
United States—and the intricacies of copyright terms—have facilitated the
aggressive litigation posture of copyright holders. Complexity of copyright law
causes a high level of uncertainty among users regarding what they can or cannot do
with creative content. The complexity of copyright provisions discourages users from
enforcing privileged or fair uses of copyrighted content in court. The specter of
litigation operates as a disincentive for unlawful as well as privileged or fair uses—
the “feared use” fallacy of fair use. Additionally, this “feared use” fallacy is
promoting a further indirect expansion of private entitlements against public
229 See Rothman, supra note 225, at 1909–910; Jeffrey Stavroff, Damages in Dissonance: The
“Shocking” Penalty for Illegal Music File-Sharing, 39 Cap. U. L. REV. 659 (2011) (discussing two
recent cases of extraordinary statutory damages penalties awarded against Jammie Thomas-Rasset
—a single mother—and Joel Tenenbaum—a graduate student at Boston University).
230 Id.
231 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012) (authorizing statutory damages of up to $150,000 for
willful infringement of copyrights).
232 See Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 313, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
237 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S 186, 262 (2003).
238 See Robert Brauneis, Copyright and the World’s Most Popular Song, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 335, 425 (concluding that the copyright should most likely be expired).
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privileges. Because of the obscurity of the law and the indeterminacy of the doctrine,
risk-adverse users are lead into seeking a licence when none is necessary. In turn, as
James Gibson pointedly noted, this practice starts a mechanism of rights accretion,
by making licencing itself a proof that the use is covered by the entitlement, and “rigs
the intellectual property game in favor of rights-holders.”239
B. Locking Cultural Icons into the Dungeons of Copyright
This over-reaching copyright culture translates into the ability of copyright law
to suppress transformative reuses of copyrighted works. The enhanced protection of
derivative works operated by modern copyright law, 240 and a shrinking fair use
doctrine,241 turn transformative uses of previous works into a nuisance for society,
rather than a creative opportunity. The parallelism between past and present
highlights the incapacity of the present copyright system to recreate the cumulative
and collaborative creative process that was so fruitful in the past. In particular, the
constant development and recursive use of iconic characters—which was an engine
for creativity in the epic literature—is but a fading memory.
Nowadays,
transformative use, characters, and cultural icons are locked into the dungeons of
copyright, the constant enlargement of which has tightened the chains holding them.
This, in turn, seems to prevent the cumulative creation of pop culture as witnessed in
the pre-modern oral-formulaic creative process, and generally in the development of
most human art and culture.
The speech-enhancing role of cultural icons and iconic characters is abridged in
at least two different directions. On a first immediate level, modern copyright
hinders the re-use of cultural icons and iconic characters as an engine of new and
cumulative popular stories and creativity. It is clear that under the present
copyright regime, these re-uses are prevented unless permission is given. On a more
subtle level, copyright law prevents the capacity of follow-on creators to make an
expressive meaning through the reference to a copyrighted item. This hindering
effect of copyright has the pernicious result of impeding newcomers from using
copyrighted information in order to challenge and oppose the mainstream culture
that the copyrighted item represents.

James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE
L.J. 882, 951 (2007); James Gibson, Accidental Rights, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 348, 350 (2007).
240 See, e.g., Christopher M. Newman, Transformation in Property and Copyright, 56 VILL. L.
REV. 251, 251–52 (2011). Newman writes:
239

Though one would expect the category of reproductions to be much narrower than
that of derivative works, in practice the two have largely merged . . . . The
meaning of reproduction has thus expanded to include both works that have no
literal similarity to the original, and ones that incorporate only a small amount of
literal copying.
Id.
241

See JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU 35–50 (2011).
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Under the present copyright paradigm, any reuse of copyrighted characters
constitutes infringement.242 Some narrow exceptions—basically in case of a clear-cut
parodying purpose—may apply. 243 But even in those instances the limitations to
copyright enforcement are uncertain at best. All modern cultural icons—such as the
Disney characters, the Marvel characters, or the characters of Star Wars, Harry
Potter, James Bond, or Rocky—are fiercely guarded by their rightsholders. Recently,
Warner Bros. has been very active in preventing any unauthorized re-use of themes
and characters from the Harry Potter saga. In Warner Bros. v. RDR Books, the
Southern District Court of New York enjoined the publication of The Harry Potter
Lexicon, a collection of factual information related to the Harry Potter saga. 244 The
Lexicon in fact was online for a long time as a fan-made repository that was
extremely popular among fans of the Harry Potter saga. 245 J. K. Rowling herself, the
author of the Harry Potter series, refers to the Lexicon website as “such a great site
that I have been known to sneak into an internet [sic] café while out writing and
check a fact rather than go into a bookshop and buy a copy of Harry Potter (which is
embarrassing).”246 Rowling and her publisher then reacted to the distribution of the
Dutch translation of Tanya Grotter and the Magical Double Bass by the Russian
author Dmitri Yemets. 247 Yemets’ book featured the story of a female apprentice
wizard that in part constituted a parody of her British colleague’s work transposed
into Russian culture and folklore.248 The book was adjudged copyright infringement
by Dutch courts.249 However, the publication was never enjoined in Russia and a
242

stated:

Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2nd Cir. 1930). Judge Learned Hand
If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second comer might
so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be
enough that for one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to
the discomfort of the household, or a vain and foppish steward who became
amorous of his mistress. . . . It follows that the less developed the characters, the
less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking
them too indistinctly.

Id.; see also Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954) (“It is
conceivable that the character really constitutes the story being told, but if the character is only the
chessman in the game of telling the story he is not within the area of the protection afforded by the
copyright.”).
243 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that
parodies are obviously transformative).
244 Warner Bros. v. RDR Books, 575 F.Supp. 2d 513, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
245 See generally Steve Vander Ark, THE HARRY POTTER LEXICON, http://www.hp-lexicon.org
(last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
246 Facts about the Harry Potter Lexicon Website, THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 15, 2008, 12:01 A.M.),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1895676/Facts-about-the-Harry-Potter-Lexiconwebsite.html.
247 See Tim Wu, Harry Potter and the International Order of Copyright, Should Tanya Grotter
and
the
Magic
Double
Bass
be
Banned?,
SLATE.COM
(June
27,
2003),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2003/06/harry_potter_and_the_intern
ational_order_of_copyright.html.
248 Id.
249 Id.
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long series of books followed from the first book, together with several other spin-offs
from the Tanya Grotter series. In addition, an Indian writer, Uttan Ghosh, wrote an
adaptation to Rowling’s saga, titled Harry Potter in Calcutta, in which the young
wizard meets several characters from Bengali literature. 250 The publication of the
story was similarly prevented by the timely intervention of the rightsholders and an
out-of-court settlement.251
The treatment of the Russian and Indian adaptations of Harry Potter witnesses
a sharp contrast to the traditional creative modes of pre-modern popular culture.
Most of the epic and romance literature strengthened out of the adaptation and
translation of characters and themes into new social and cultural settings. In
contrast, this very creative process is perceived as free-riding by modern standards.
Was the endless line of Greek poets performing and mashing up the Iliad and the
Odyssey free-riding over their predecessors? Were the jongleurs, bards, minstrels,
and clerks free-riding on each other when they rewrote and performed the Chanson
de Roland from court to court, from courtyard to courtyard, from France to England,
from Italy to Spain? Was Chretien de Troyes free-riding over French and Celtic
authors when he wrote his Perceval? Were Wauchier de Denain, Manessier, one
Gerbert de Montreuil, and a fourth anonymous author free-riding over Chrétien
when they wrote their continuations to Perceval? Was Matteo Maria Boiardo freeriding over Luigi Pulci’s Morgante to write his Orlando Innamorato, and was
Ludovico Aristo free-riding over both of them when he wrote one of the masterpieces
of the Renaissance literature, the Orlando Furioso?
More disturbingly—if there is anything more disturbing than having denied the
essential rules that governed our cultural history—the emphasis of the present
copyright system on the exclusive nature of the creative process, rather than its
inclusive nature, is increasingly showing unexpected and unwanted consequences.
These results run counter to the values of freedom of expression that our society
apparently seems to promote. Even those narrow exceptions that should provide the
system with some balance seem to often fail their goals. Having lost the perception
that creativity is a necessitated instrument of community appurtenance, society has
hindered the capacity to engage in unrestrained social discourse, especially when
commodified creativity becomes a cultural standard.
In a few instances—such as most prominently in the parodying sequel of Gone
with the Wind, the novel The Wind Done Gone, in which Alice Randall rewrites the
original story from the black slave’s perspective—freedom of expression has been
upheld to constrain the enforcement of copyright and allow the free re-use of
copyrighted characters.252 Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Recently, the
Second Circuit confirmed that Fredrik Colting could not revive, at least in the U.S.,
Holden Caulfield and other characters of Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye.253 In
Salinger v. Colting, the Court decided that it was not fair use for Colting to have a
76-year-old Holden Caulfield, referred to as Mr. C, brought back to life by a 90-yearSee id.
Id.
252 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001).
253 See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 2010), vacating Salinger v. Colting, 641
F.Supp.2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
250
251
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old author, a fictionalized Salinger, wishing to kill him.254 The plot of Colting’s book,
60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye, struggles with the lifestyle of Salinger,
who seemingly wanted to remove himself and the memory of his characters from
society. 255 Salinger has not published since 1965. 256 He has never permitted
adaptations of his works, other than a 1949 film adaptation of one of his early short
stories.257 He was in the spotlight for harshly enforcing his copyrights and for an
endless number of lawsuits.258
Colting claimed that his book is a “critical examination of the character Holden
and the way he is portrayed in [The Catcher in the Rye], the relationship between
Salinger and his iconic creation, and the life of a particular author as he grows old
but remains imprisoned by the literary character he created.” 259 Colting’s critique of
Salinger seems to be exactly what freedom of expression in a democratic society
should protect. To me, personally, then, the story is very meaningful. I read it as a
metaphorical allegory of the very arguments I try to put forward here. The author
Salinger is a quintessential expression of modern copyright culture and its obsession
with absolute originality that has long lost sight of the cumulative, collaborative and
social nature of creativity. The metaphor embedded in Colting’s book challenges that
culture by challenging Salinger. Colting expresses the concern that the final outcome
of this copyright obsession will be to kill our own characters, together with our own
culture. He wishes therefore that Salinger may recover from his obsession and set
Holden free. Ironically enough, challenging the publication of the book in court
proved the very argument that Colting presented in his book. A court upholding
Salinger’s claim would empower that argument even further. The Second Circuit did
not catch the irony, most likely, and confirmed that characters are locked into the
dungeons of copyright, if the author wishes so.
In cases such as Suntrust and Colting, the balance to be struck between freedom
of expression and private entitlements becomes far more delicate, and often copyright
law fails to achieve it. In these instances, the object of copyright protection has
become a cultural standard. Therefore, similar competition problems to those in the
field of technological standards arise when access is sought for participation in the
social dialogue. 260 Instead of newcomers challenging leading market positions,
alternative or minority culture may be willing to challenge mainstream culture. In
these instances, the owner of copyright in the standard might completely refuse to
license her work, so to prevent it from being criticized or from being used to convey
messages to which the author objects.
Id. at 70–72.
Id. at 72.
256 Id. at 71.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 72.
260 Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 363 (2005)
(noting that a fair use doctrine “more attentive to the ways in which context shapes creative practice
might conclude, by analogy to the metaphoric functionality principle that emerges from the software
copyright cases, that a broader range of uses undertaken by users for purposes of interoperating
with their own culture should be permissible”). On the contrary, Cohen concludes that “most courts
have steadfastly resisted developing such principles of “cultural interoperability” to apply in nonsoftware cases.” Id.
254
255
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The scenario is the same as that reviewed in nonsensical decisions like Walt
Disney v. Air Pirates.261 Here, the court denied the right of a group of cartoonists to
publish an adult “counter-culture” comic book featuring Disney characters “as active
members of a free thinking, promiscuous, drug ingesting counterculture.” 262 In order
to exclude fair use, the court boasts about the substantiality of the use and nearverbatim copying, as if the parodist should draw a stylized mouse or duck so that
nobody will ever catch the reference, and perhaps, in order to help the readers
understand, they should add a footnote saying: “we know the drawings suck and do
not resemble the original, but this scribble is supposed to be Mickey Mouse, Minnie
or Donald Duck.”263 In these instances, the idea-expression dichotomy is unable to
prevent a conflict between copyright and free speech. As Fiona Macmillan has noted,
“[i]t seems likely that representational copyright works (photographs, films,
drawings, paintings) are particularly likely to attract the claim that freedom of
speech cannot be properly served by simply describing the idea behind the
expression.” 264 Legal standards may slightly change and the idea-expression
dichotomy may work better with different medium of expression. Here and there,
courts may get it right. Later, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court
distinguished Air Pirates and held that the parodying use of Roy Orbison’s rock
ballad “Oh, Pretty Woman” by the rap group 2 Live Crew in their song “Pretty
Woman” was fair.265
Although courts may stretch copyright law to make room for cultural standards,
the tension does not go away. If the rightsholders feel threatened—economically and
culturally—they recursively react to the use of cultural icons and try to enforce their
power of control over them by deploying legal weaponry against derivative re-users.
Regardless of legal standards adopted by judicial bodies, which are inconsistent and
unpredictable at best, the rightsholders’ reaction often becomes an insurmountable
burden to free expression and, in any event, a strong disincentive to it. The
California group Negativland, for instance, had its expressive freedom curtailed after
being sued by Island Record and Warner-Chappell Music for “messing” with U2’s “I
Still Haven’t Found What I’m Looking For.”266 Negativland’s wrongdoing consisted
of recasting U2’s music with a musical collage, a commentary, interviews with Bono,
and outtakes from Casey Kasem’s American Top 40 radio show to criticize a
perceived hypocrisy in U2’s message. 267 Notwithstanding U2’s opposition to the
lawsuit, Negativland and its independent distributor SST were forced to settle
because of an inability to afford litigation expenses.268
Nadia Plesner—a Danish artist and activist—also had to face invasive
enforcement of cultural icons and has seen her capacity to challenge the meaning of
Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, (9th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 753.
263 Id. at 758.
264 Fiona Macmillan, Commodification and Cultural Ownership, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE
SPEECH: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES 57 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen
eds., 2003).
265 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994).
266 See DEMERS, supra note 219, at 128–30.
267 Id.
268 Id.
261
262
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those cultural icons substantially curtailed by copyright and intellectual property
law. Among Nadia’s featured works is the satirical depiction of a malnourished
African child holding a fancy little chihuahua and a designer bag, also included in a
painting that goes by the name Darfurnica. 269 These works of art triggered the
disgruntled reaction of Louis Vuitton.270 The designer bag carried by the boy, in fact,
resembles the Louis Vuitton “Audra” bag.271 Louis Vuitton sued, and the Court of
The Hague rendered an ex parte decision against Nadia Plesner, ordering her to pay
several hundred thousand euros, including penalties for each day the painting was
still shown.272 This case deserves attention as an extreme example of the troubled
coexistence between freedom of expression and property entitlements over creativity.
Control over intellectual property, especially over copyrighted content, seems to
trespass into a form of control over our society’s cultural and ethical tenets. In this
respect, throughout the decades, Vuitton and others have contributed to a social
syllogism where display of luxury equals success, and success through display of
luxury is the trigger for global attention. In the case of Nadia Plesner, overexpansive practices of intellectual property enforcement are used to protect and keep
that syllogism in place, together with the capitalist model that the syllogism is set to
serve. Similarly, intellectual property rights may be enforced to prevent the
emergence of a wide range of counter-cultural speech. As Madhavi Sunder recently
observed, intellectual property law, and copyright law especially, substantially
affects the democratic process because “semiotic democracy requires the ability to
resignify the artifacts of popular culture to contest their authoritative meaning.” 273
There may be a subtle shift of intellectual property rights as a mechanism to protect
business goodwill to an instrument of enforcement of cultural paradigms. Quite
indisputably, this profound influence of intellectual property rights on our cultural
landscape is far beyond their literal scope of protection. As a consequence,
intellectual property may end up aiding cultural indoctrination and championing
censorship of opposing cultural paradigms.
C. Sampling, Identity Politics, and Remix
Now, I will return to the very case that has prompted Chuck D to seek the
expert testimony heard in the previous pages. After the expansionistic copyright
protection given by decisions like Grand Upright and Bridgeport Music, the “bright
line rule” has become that either one gets a license or one does not sample.274 As
269 See The Making of Darfurnica, NADIA PLESNER, http://www.nadiaplesner.com/simple-living-darfurnica1 (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
270 See Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v. Nadia Plesner Joensen, et al., KG RK 10–214 (Court of
The Hague, Jan. 27, 2011) (ex parte court order).
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GLOBAL
JUSTICE 108 (2012).
274 See Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 185
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 809–10 (6th Cir. 2005);
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J. C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural
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mentioned in the beginning of this article, copyright has negatively and substantially
affected the music of Public Enemy and many other samplers. By 1992, the style of
the critically acclaimed It Takes a Nation of Millions and Fear of a Black Planet was
no more. The copyright permission paradigm made it forbidden creativity, or at least
hard enough to make to be practically forbidden. Building his sonic wall, Public
Enemy attempted to make use of his own communitarian musical tradition, deeply
rooted within African American and Caribbean culture of musical borrowing. 275 But
as the law is engineered, Public Enemy, and many other samplers, had to face the
hurdle that their use of the common African American tradition entailed a process of
re-appropriation from what was earlier appropriated by the mainstream media and
entertainment system. That hurdle proved to be insurmountable. Copyright law
affected Public Enemy, and the subculture that they spearheaded, far beyond market
constraints. Public Enemy’s work was, as hip-hop music was earlier, representative
of the cultural identity of a minority reacting to mainstream hegemonic power and
rapping about “white supremacy, capitalism, the music industry, black nationalism,
pop culture.”276 One of the innovative features of digital sampling was to empower
creators with limited market power to produce music by collaging together what was
traditionally believed to be part of a common pool of musical stock, belonging
especially to the African American community. With digital sampling, creators like
Public Enemy could easily bypass the filter of the music industry and most of the
economic hurdles associated with preproduction and studio session costs. Reviewing
the distinction between copyright in sound recording and composition, the Bridgeport
court discusses this exact point but misses it. 277 By concluding that de minimis
analysis should not be applied to copyrights over sound recordings, and that
samplers can simply recreate the riff themselves, the court completely overlooked the
value that digital sampling has for democratic discourse and identity politics. 278
The hindering effect of copyright over creativity, freedom of expression, and
identity politics has grown exponentially with the widespread diffusion of digital
technology and the emergence of remix creativity in an interconnected society. In
The Public Domain, Professor Boyle described the story of the song “George Bush
Doesn’t Care about Black People” by the Legendary K.O.—a protest song against the

Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 642 (2006); David Sanjek, “Don’t Have to DJ No More” Sampling and
the “Autonomous” Creator, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 607, 620–21 (1992).
275 See Arewa, supra note 274, at 619–28 (discussing African-American musical borrowing);
Larisa Mann, Decolonizing Networked Technology:
Learning from the Street Dance, in
TRANSNATIONAL CULTURE IN THE INTERNET AGE (Sean Pager & Adam Candeub, eds., 2012)
(discussing hip-hop’s roots in Jamaican dancehall culture and the Caribbean culture of musical
borrowing and social authorship); Jason Toynbee, Reggae Open Source: How the Absence of
Copyright Enabled the Emergence of Popular Music in Jamaica, in COPYRIGHT AND PIRACY: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 357–73 (Lionel Bently, Jennifer Davis, & Jane C. Ginsburg eds.,
2010); Johnson Okpaluba, ‘Free Riding on the Riddim’? Open Source, Copyright Law and Reggae
Music in Jamaica, in COPYRIGHT AND PIRACY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 374–86 (Lionel
Bently, Jennifer Davis, & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2010).
276 MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 1, at 66.
277 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801–02 (overlooking the fact that the original sample has itself
a historical and evocative value that cannot be replicated).
278 See id.
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government in the days of Hurricane Katrina. 279 As Boyle discusses in detail, the
lineage of that song can be traced back through one hundred years of borrowings,
samplings, and mash-ups. It features Ray Charles and Clara Ward, all the way to
Kanye West, the hip hop musician who actually uttered the words giving the song its
title and emblematic line. That lineage can be traced back from soul, blues, and
gospel to rap and hip-hop. “George Bush Doesn’t Care about Black People” and the
remix videos made after it became an astounding online hit. It defined the reaction
to Hurricane Katrina. But it never appeared on television and never made it to the
mainstream media. Under the present legal framework, that song is illegal. Or, it is
at least unmanageable, as far as transaction costs are concerned, to determine
whether the sampling embedded in it is legal. Although “George Bush Doesn’t Care
about Black People” was widely promoted by the power of propagation of the
Internet, copyright law still relegates digital remix and similar creative models to a
subcultural niche. The sad irony is that the mainstream entertainment industry has
privatized an originally common stock of tunes, sounds, melodies and lyrics behind
unmanageable copyright transaction costs. They “have denied the ability of the
original community to borrow back.” 280 Similarly to the case of Public Enemy’s
music, Legendary K.O. could cheaply create and bypass the filter of mainstream
music industry. The side effect, however, would be to not have access to mainstream
media channels. While technology has empowered minorities to more incisively and
easily express their cultural identities, copyrighted works have the effect of
restricting them and maintaining them as minor subcultural expressions. Together
with the bright line rules that the law or cases like Bridgeport set, copyright blurs
the contours of what can be and cannot be done, transforming “fair uses” into “feared
uses.” Even communal, cumulative and traditional creativity gets swollen in the
chasms opening up here and there, hidden in the nebula of what the law allows or
does not allow.
Most creative practices in the digital domain suffer similar limitations.
Fangaming—the practice of modifying video games either to create a new video game
or solely to create a work of art—has experienced great popularity among the gaming
communities, often in response to the inactivity of copyright owners to offer sequels
of their favorite games.281 Rightsholders have usually been resolute in shutting down
those projects, as in the case of Chrono Trigger, a role-playing video game originally
developed by Square Enix in 1995 and followed by a 1999 official sequel, Chrono
Cross.282 Fan projects to develop a sequel for PC with 3D graphics, such as Chrono
Resurrection, Chrono Trigger Remake Project, and Chrono Trigger: Crimson Echoes,
were repeatedly undertaken from 2004 to 2009 and forcibly terminated through

279

(2009).

See James Boyle, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 124–59

Id. at 129.
See Burk Dan, The Mereology Of Digital Copyright, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 711, 730–34 (2008); Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998).
282 See Chrono Cross, IGN ENTERTAINMENT, http://web.archive.org/web/20070320044123/
http://www.rottentomatoes.com/g/playstation/chrono_cross/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
280
281
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Square Enix’s cease-and-desist letters. 283 The story of the sequel Chrono Trigger
molds well to the larger picture of the tension between copyright, media
conglomerate dominance, and fan-made creativity. All the elements of that tension
are at play here. Fair uses are recurrently turned into “feared uses” and copyright
becomes absolute. The rightsholders often issue a cease-and-desist letter to
intimidate users and fan-authors, who are often clueless as to the full extent of the
protection attached to copyright.284 As media guru Henry Jenkins noted, “[i]n such
situations, the studios often assert much broader control than they could legally
defend: someone who stands to lose their home or their kid’s college funds by going
head-to-head with studio attorneys is apt to fold.” 285 Although fair use defenses can
be put forward on solid grounds, as many authors have argued, 286 users are unaware
or at least confused about where to draw the line. Most of the time, they retreat and
give up their creative projects. For this very reason, there is no case law on noncommercial fan-made creativity.287
Liability concerns of platforms hosting fan-made creativity, then, add up to the
chilling effects of the copyright system. In order to shield Internet Service Providers
(“ISPs”) from liability, legislatures worldwide have enacted DMCA-like notice-andtakedown procedures.288 Recently, a DMCA notice was good enough to take down an
entire world, albeit a virtual one.289 This is disappointing news for fans of Second
Life’s role-playing “Sim” based around Frank Herbert’s famous Dune series.
Following the DMCA notice of copyright infringement from Trident Media Group, the
agency administering Herbert’s estate, Linden Lab, gave two days to the Sim’s
administrators to comply with the rightsholders’ requests and remove all the Dunethemed items, characters and names. 290 As Reichmann argued, the DMCA
“shamelessly sacrificed the public interest provisions of copyright law on the altar of”
private interest.291 In fact, the DMCA notice-and-takedown process has given the
copyright holders a new leverage weapon that makes the spectre of copyright shine
even brighter in the nebula of “user-generated” confusion.292 The recent copyright
283 See CHRONO RESURRECTION (Sept. 6, 2004), http://www.opcoder.com/projects/chrono
(announcing the abandonment of the project as a consequence of the cease-and-desist letter form the
rights holders); CHRONO TRIGGER REMAKE PROJECT, http://www.chrono-trigger.com.
284 See HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE 142
(N.Y. Univ. Press 2008).
285 Id.
286 See SUNDER, supra note 273, at 105–24; Mary W.S. Wong, “Transformative” User-Generated
Content in Copyright Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
1075, 1127 (2009); Rebecca Tushnet, User-generated Discontent: Transformation in Practice, 31
COLUM. J. L. & Arts 497, 516 (2008).
287 See JENKINS, supra note 284, at 142.
288 See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)).
289 See Patrick McKay, Note, Culture of the Future: Adapting Copyright Law to Accommodate
Fan-Made Derivative Works in the Twenty-First Century, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 117, 137 (2010).
290 Id.
291 Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and
Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22
BERKELEY TECH L.J. 982, 1013 (2007).
292 See Greg Lastowka, User-Generated Content and Virtual Worlds, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 893, 913 (2008).
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holders’ strategy has increasingly been to seek enforcement of ISPs’ secondary
liability with the overt goal of turning them into watchdogs. The response of Linden
Lab to Herbert’s estate is indicative of the considerable success of this strategy.
In many different forms, users appropriate from commercial culture to create
their own culture. 293 In doing so, users ignore copyright law. In order to create
fanvids, fanfiction, musical mash-up, machinima, or reproduce a video clip to be
discussed or perhaps decontextualized, users infringe on copyright. At the same
time, users create without an interest in how copyright law would protect their works
and “de-commodify” the commercial culture from which they have appropriated. 294
By ignoring copyright, however, users, and their own emerging digital culture, are at
the mercy of the commercial culture that they have appropriated. Mainstream
corporate-driven culture may use copyright law or its specter to marginalize
competing or alternative cultural paradigms. Even if user-generated culture is
tolerated,295 its terms of service are set by commercial culture, and spearheaded by
copyright law. At its own will, mainstream corporate-driven culture can prevent
users from building their own cultures or influence the directions that such cultures
will take. A couple of years after the Dune Sim in Second Life was shut down, fans
are still looking for a home where they can enjoy their common passion absent the
irrational, arbitrary, and inconsistent reactions of copyright holders to fan-made
creativity. In responding to one user looking for people interested in role playing in
the Dune universe and coming to know that the Dune Sim was no more because of
the rightsholder’s complaint, Vashara comments:
Wow, really I’m a Dune fan myself and a star wars roleplayer. Weird how
they shut down dune and yet the whole star wars and harry potter sims
never got shut down nor did the legend of the seeker roleplays. I think its
[sic] stupid, infact [sic] when you roleplay you’re actually advertising and
promiting [sic] their product, because people will see and ask what is Dune,
and we tell them its [sic] a good and then they go read it, thus making more

293 See Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A Manifesto for UserGenerated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 934–54 (2009) (discussing different forms of
appropriation on YouTube).
294 Id. at 936–37, 940. Halbert wrote:

When fans take culture-industry products and make them into something that
has social value for them . . . they are decommodifying culture by taking it out of
its profit-oriented platform and transforming it not only into a derivative work
under copyright law, but also into something that has cultural meaning that goes
beyond monetary value.
Id.
295 See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 617, 620 (2008) (noting that, in contrast
with implied licencing, in the case of tolerated use “the main point is that liability likely exists, but
it is simply a matter of non-enforcement”).
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money for the authors and publishing companies. Duh, lol, are they that
thick?296
IV. CLOSING ARGUMENT
For most of human history, the essential nature of creativity was understood to
be cumulative and collective. We have built most of our culture under a paradigm in
which appropriation and the “art of rewriting” was a value for creativity, rather than
a nuisance. Epic and popular culture thrived under that creative paradigm. Modern
copyright and authorship law, however, turns the very propulsive engine of the
creative process—appropriation, imitation, and borrowing of the tradition to build
follow-on creativity—into a nuisance, rather than a foundational block. User-based
creativity, empowered by digital technology and networked distribution, can help the
resurgence of a flourishing popular culture. As authors have noted, “fan-made
derivative works based on works of popular culture have a growing importance in
twenty-first century culture, and in fact represent the rebirth of popular folk culture
in America [and elsewhere] after a century of being submerged beneath commercial
mass-media cultural products.”297
A. From Exclusivity to Inclusivity
As Debora Halbert noted, “[w]e need a cultural world where de-commodified
culture prevails and people are able to build something creative on the foundation of
what already exists.” 298 The problem lies in what Lessig has referred to as the
tension between a “free” and a “permission” culture: “we come from a tradition of
‘free culture.’ . . . The opposite of a free culture is a ‘permission culture’—a culture in
which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators
from the past.”299 It is the overexpansion of a “permission” culture that collides with
the traditional mechanics of creativity and the democratic value that creativity
encloses.
It particularly curtails modern forms of digital creativity. The interactive
nature of the web 2.0 has propelled user-generated creativity that thrives in a “free”
culture and withers in a “permission” culture. 300 In the digital age, users and
Post from Vashara, SECOND LIFE (Mar. 20, 2012, 08:00 AM), http://community.second
life.com/t5/Role-Play/Role-play-DUNE/td-p/1352033 (click on “Forums,” then select “People Forum
Role Play,” then “Role Play Dune”).
297 McKay, supra note 287, at 145.
298 See Halbert, supra note 293, at 960.
299 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY xiv (Penguin 2004).
300 Several scholars have proposed a dual regime for professionals and amateurs.
See
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY 33, 254–
59 (Bloomsbury 2008); Christopher May, Bounded Openness: The Future of Political Economy of
Knowledge Management, 33 EIPR 477, 479–80 (2011) (arguing that the system of IP law will evolve
into parallel hard and soft systems); Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives
with Reality by Using Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 41 (2008).
296
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creators have an enhanced interest in free and open re-use of intellectual content.
Fanfiction community, machinima and mash-up communities, and in general online
communities based upon user-generated content build their creative ethics over open
re-use and remix. Mass collaboration, mass creativity, and collective and networked
peer production enhance and multiply the value of re-use. After the advent of the
web 2.0, the enjoyment of creativity becomes more and more an interactive process,
and creativity becomes more and more a phenomenon of collective production. The
capacity of easily remixing content turns users into authors with global and
instantaneous capacity for distributing their own works.
In order to adjust the copyright system to the modern networked digital
creativity, one necessary measure may be an inversion of the traditional copyright
permission rule. The rejection of the copyright permission rule should be coupled
with the implementation of additional mechanisms to provide economic incentive to
creation, such as a liability rule integrated into the system or possibly an
apportionment of profits. The re-definition of the traditional copyright permission
paradigm would fit, in my view, within the partial de-construction of the postromantic paradigm which over-emphasizes creative individualism and absolute
originality. It would serve the goal of reconnecting creativity with its cumulative
nature.
Given that the moral right of attribution will always remain the cornerstone of
any revised creativity management system, 301 one should distinguish between
reproductive use and creative use of intellectual works. I believe that creative use
should be allowed to the public at large with no permission required in order to
perform it. As it was traditionally for most of human cultural history, the right to
appropriate expressions should be absolute. On the absolutistic nature of the right to
borrow and reuse others’ creativity, I follow in the footsteps of David Lange, Jefferson
Powel, and Jed Rubenfeld.302 I do not see meaningful reasons for the appropriation
to not extend beyond private appropriation for personal use and include competitive
or commercial uses, if the right mechanisms to compensate authors are in place. I
therefore locate my proposal within the framework set by Lange and Powel in the
A dual regime has been proposed also by European legal scholarship. See Marco Ricolfi, Consume
and Share: Making Copyright Fit for the Digital Agenda, in THE DIGITAL PUBLIC DOMAIN, 49–60
(M. Dulong de Rosnay & J.C. De Martin eds., Open Book Publishers 2012); Christophe Geiger,
Promoting Creativity Through Copyright Limitations: Reflections on the Concept of Exclusivity in
Copyright Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. TECH. L. 515, 547–48 (2011) (proposing the dual regime in the
context of creative reuses).
301 In contrast, integrity is irrelevant if it is spelled out that the original work has been
tampered with.
302 See DAVID LANGE & JEFFERSON H. POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 384 n.37 (Stanford Law Books 2009); Jed Rubenfeld,
The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (2002) (noting that
“copyright’s prohibition of unauthorized derivative works is unconstitutional, but that it could be
saved if its regime of injunctions and damages were replaced by an action for profit allocation”). In a
similar fashion, the principle of exclusivity in copyright has also been challenged in civil law
systems. Geiger, supra note 300, at 547 (proposing the implementation of a “limitation-friendly
copyright protection, even if doing so would require rethinking the principle of exclusivity on which
intellectual property is based [and] the scope of copyright is reduced to the prevention of the mere
copy of the work, and does not cover the creative re-uses”).
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following terms: “a provision for apportioning revenues resulting from competitive
appropriation, one that is calculated to preserve incentives to create the original
work without impairing the absolute freedom of others to bend that work to the
service of their own further expression.” 303 I think that each creator should enjoy (1)
a statutory royalty upon any revenue stream coming from the derivative work (2)
upon a claim to be made within a certain period. This way, if the incentive to create
was based on the foreseeability of reaping any benefit from derivative works, the
author should diligently and promptly patrol the market. 304 The royalty scheme may
be implemented so that the quality and market success of the original work is taken
into consideration. A solution may be to maintain a fixed statutory royalty in
accordance with different classes related to the type and diffusion of the works.
Technology will definitely help to calculate quality and impact of the borrowed
materials. The author will have the burden to show any supporting evidence to have
the work included in a certain class. 305
In a similar fashion to that envisioned for creative uses, no permission would be
required to make commercial reproductive use of an intellectual work. In contrast to
the case of creative use, the compensatory regime for reproductive uses would be
closer to a liability regime.306 In this case, in fact, there is no contribution to the
creative process to balance the appropriation of another’s creativity. Therefore, the
creator has the right to internalize the full market value of the appropriated work.
In any event, the compensation to the author should never be inferior to the market
price set by the author, if the author chooses to directly sell the work. Far more
effectively than with creative uses, digital watermarking technologies would allow
almost perfect tracking of the commercial life of the work. In contrast, public noncommercial reproductive use, which includes peer-to-peer piracy, would be in the sole
domain of the author. Only the author would be entitled to authorize the
reproduction, circulation, and distribution of her works for non-commercial uses.
Present exceptions and limitations will apply to that exclusive right. Cultural flat-

LANGE & POWELL, supra note 302, at 143, 181.
See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 1569, 1603–24 (2009); Loren, supra note 300, at 34 (arguing for the necessity of taking
motivation into account when determining the scope of copyright protection).
305 I realize that adjustment and polishing of the arrangement that I am supporting need to be
done, especially in relation to the inclusion of more than one work in the new derivative work. At
the moment, I will pass on this, as a detailed definition of the system would need a treatment on its
own, which is beyond the scope of my present undertaking.
306 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1120 (1972); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV.
713, 766 (1996); Jerome H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in
Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1781 (2000); Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis,
Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to
Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 337–66 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman
eds., 2005); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1376 (1996); Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual
Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 254 (2009).
303
304

[13:341 2014]
Rediscovering Cumulative Creativity From the
Oral Formulaic Tradition to Digital Remix: Can I Get a Witness?

393

rate mechanisms, 307 alternative compensation systems, 308 or extended collective
licensing schemes309 will most likely be introduced to decriminalize peer-to-peer file
exchange, fix the orphan work problem, and ease non-commercial digitization
projects.
The implementation of a creativity management system along these guidelines
may have actual substantial advantages for the authors. Each use of their works
may be a potential source of revenues. Further, the absence of transaction costs for
licensing the rights may boost the number of derivative and reproductive uses.
Additionally, creators’ revenues will be attached to the success of creativity
cumulatively made on top of their own. This, in turn, may have positive social
externalities, by connecting directly individual economic success with the success of
other individuals and the surrounding creative community. Creativity would return
to being an inclusive, rather than exclusive, medium.
B. From the Oral Formulaic Tradition to Digital Remix
Rereading the history of aesthetic is particularly inspiring at the dawn of the
networked age. The Internet may be a privileged venue to reproduce the mechanics
of the oral tradition. 310 It is difficult to overlook the special connection that the
mechanics of pre-modern creativity share with post-modern forms of digital
creativity. The dynamics of sharing of pre-modern creativity, together with the
cumulative nature of the oral-formulaic creative process, parallel the features of
digital networked creativity. Digital creativity reconnects its exponential generative
capacity to the ubiquity of participatory contributions. As in the oral-formulaic
307 See Alain Modot et al., The “Content Flat-Rate”: A Solution to Illegal File-Sharing?, in
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICY, POLICY DEPARTMENT B:
STRUCTURAL AND COHESION POLICIES, CULTURE AND EDUCATION 65–102 (2011), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?language=en&file=44308;
INSTITUT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES MEDIENRECHT [INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN MEDIA LAW] (EML), DIE
ZULÄSSIGKEIT EINER KULTURFLATRATE NACH NATIONALEM UND EUROPÄISCHEM RECHT [THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF A CULTURAL FLAT RATE UNDER NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW] 63 (2009)
available at http://www.gruene-bundestag.de/cms/netzpolitik/dokbin/278/278059.kurzgutachten
_zur_kulturflatrate.pdf; Bernt Hugenholtz, Lucie Guibault, & Sjoerd Van Geffen, The Future Of
Levies In A Digital Environment, in INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION LAW (2003), available at
http://www.ivir.nl/ publications/ other/DRM&levies-report.pdf.
308 See WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT 9 (2004); Neil W. Netanel, Impose A Noncommercial Use Levy To Allow Free PeerTo-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 77 (2003).
309 See, e.g., Marco Ciurcina, Juan Carlos De martin, Thomas Margoni, Federico Morando, and
Marco Ricolfi, Creatività Remunerata, Conoscenza Liberata: File Sharing e Licenze Collettive Estese
[Remunerating Creativity, Freeing Knowledge: File-Sharing and Extended Collective Licenses],
NEXA CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY (2009), available at http://nexa.polito.it/licenzecollettive;
Johan Axhamn and Lucie Guibault, Cross-border Extended Collective Licensing: a Solution to Online
Dissemination
of
Europe’s
Cultural
Heritage?,
IViR
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/guibault/ECL_Europeana_final_report092011.pdf.
310 See
THE PATHWAYS PROJECT, ORAL TRADITION AND INTERNET TECHNOLOGY,
http://www.pathwaysproject.org/pathways/show/HomePage (last visited Jan. 19, 2014) (drawing
parallels between the media dynamics of oral traditions and the Internet).
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tradition, mass collaboration is a key element of production in the digital
environment.
Again, emerging creative productions, including remix, mash-up, musical
sampling, vidding, and the creative process developing in Youtube-like environments,
implement the logic of the traditional oral-formulaic creative production. It does so by
cumulatively building creativity over the reuse, expansion, and reassembling of
minimal bits of creative discourse. The sample and the clip of the remix tradition
correspond to the formula of the oral tradition. The formula, the single unit to be
used and reused, worked and reworked, is the inspiring paradigm of the remix
culture.
Moreover, digital creativity re-implements the same mechanics of pre-copyright
creativity that envisioned borrowing and copying as a necessary tribute to previous
works. As in the pre-modern tradition, digital creativity deploys appropriation and
borrowing as imitative and emulative instruments. From fanfiction to “machinima”
and fangames, from thematic Sims in virtual worlds to vidding or music mash-up,
modern digital creativity is made of appropriation, borrowing, and imitation that are
laid out to create new meanings and find new inferences. They are intended to pay
tribute to the iconography of the commercial popular culture as well as to challenge,
deconstruct, and overcome it.
Social textuality and intertextuality, which are dominating features of medieval
creativity, play a pivotal role in the digital domain as well. On one hand, the
intertextual nature of medieval literary culture, as a constant reference to authority
and tradition to which the textile metaphor of the word “text” evokes, shows an
affinity with the hyper-textuality of digital culture and creativity. Linking is a builtin feature of creativity produced in a digital environment. On the other hand, the
social malleability of the text in pre-modern manuscript culture finds a parallel in
mass-collaborative projects in the digital environment, such as Wikipedia.
Finally, the networked society sets the preconditions for a social and
collaborative idea of authorship that resembles the pre-modern collectivistic idea of
creativity. More conspicuously than ever, digital creativity is deeply intertwined
with communitarian actions and reactions. Open source software developments,
Wikipedia, fangames, and thematic “Sims” grow out of peer and mass-collaborative
creative projects. Vidding, “machinima,” musical sampling and mash-up compose a
puzzle of responses and memes as part of a hyper-reactive community environment.
In the digital environment, creativity returns to be an inclusive, rather than
exclusive, medium. This may suggest that, in the networked information society and
economy, we are witnessing the demise of the individualistic idea of authorship that
gave birth to our copyright system.
The parallel between formula, remix, and mash-up, intertextual medieval
creativity and hyper-textual digital creativity, social textuality and masscollaboration in the manuscript and digital culture, may suggest an emerging
dystonia between the post-romantic paradigm of authorship and the present cultural
and creative landscape. This dystonia reverberates on the obsolescence of the
present policies for creativity. It suggests that the communal, collaborative, and
cumulative role of creativity should be emphasized and promoted. The emergence of
the digital participative culture may offer the opportunity to realign creativity with
its original participative nature. As in pre-modern culture, the idea of inclusivity in
the discourse about creativity has regained momentum with the emphasis on
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community, participation, and mass and cumulative production in the digital
environment. As in pre-modern culture, a re-emerging social consciousness indicates
that creativity must serve as an instrument to empower the individual to be part of a
community, rather than stand out of it.
Change in our creative environment is in progress. In the twilight of a system,
it may be inspiring to look at the dawn of our knowledge governance in order to
understand how to start the new day to come. Digital technology and creativity look
back at the generative capacity of the traditional cumulative, collaborative, and
communitarian mechanics of creativity as an evidentiary basis for reform.
Reporting a last quip from my fantastic trial, and playing the role of Chuck D’s
attorney one more time, as a last question, I asked Homer, “Do you think we would
have had the Iliad and the Odyssey if Bridgeport and the like was the law in force at
the time?”
Homer decidedly said, “No.”
“I have no further questions.”

